IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel

Larger state-allocation footprints predict weaker private-credit depth and slower innovation diffusion after country and year fixed effects.

The market mechanism is that decentralized credit allocation and private entry reveal dispersed information; the state-allocation counterclaim is that public direction can allocate capital toward strategic innovation without crowding out private discovery.

REFUTEDengine/runs/state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel

REFUTED — coef=+5.864 (sign opposite claim -), p=0.000387

confidence cueThis test cuts against the claim as written or misses its pre-declared threshold.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Does the policy environment make innovation easier to fund, build, and scale, or does it slow down useful new technology?

plain answer

The data did not support the prediction. coef=+5.864 (sign opposite claim -), p=0.000387

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 41 country or place units from 1996 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Government consumption share
  • Efw size of government
What we checked
  • Private credit depth
  • Resident patent applications per million
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel
1007550250199620102023ARGAUSAUTBELBRACANCHE
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show private_credit_depth across 41 sampled countries over 1996–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:26Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Larger state-allocation footprints predict weaker private-credit depth and slower innovation diffusion after country and year fixed effects. The market mechanism is that decentralized credit allocation and private entry reveal dispersed information; the state-allocation counterclaim is that public direction can allocate capital toward strategic innovation without crowding out private discovery.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if government_consumption_share is negative for private_credit_depth at p<=0.10 with at least 300 observations and 25 countries. REFUTED if the coefficient is positive at p<=0.10 under the same sample floor. Otherwise PARTIAL or INCONCLUSIVE.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
41 countries · 1996 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Primary outcome is private_credit_depth. Patent applications are reported as an innovation-diffusion mechanism check and should not determine the primary verdict by itself.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
private_credit_depth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZStier 2
level
resident_patent_applications_per_million
outcome
wipo:patent_applications_residenttier 2
log_per_million_population
government_consumption_share
treatment
world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2
level
efw_size_of_government
treatment
fraser_efw:efw_paneltier 4
area_1_size_of_government_inverted
log_gdp_pc_ppp
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
rule_of_law
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level
inflation
control
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel

Verdict: REFUTED — coef=+5.864 (sign opposite claim -), p=0.000387

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Larger state-allocation footprints predict weaker private-credit depth and slower innovation diffusion after country and year fixed effects. The market mechanism is that decentralized credit allocation and private entry reveal dispersed information; the state-allocation counterclaim is that public direction can allocate capital toward strategic innovation without crowding out private discovery.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if government_consumption_share is negative for private_credit_depth at p<=0.10 with at least 300 observations and 25 countries. REFUTED if the coefficient is positive at p<=0.10 under the same sample floor. Otherwise PARTIAL or INCONCLUSIVE.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_state_allocation_private_credit_innovation_panel

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +5.864
  • Std error: 1.644
  • p-value: 0.000387
  • Observations: 726, countries: 33
  • Within R²: 0.283
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS → private_credit_depth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9562)
  • wipo:patent_applications_resident → resident_patent_applications_per_million (outcome, publisher=wipo, n=4180)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS → government_consumption_share (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)
  • fraser_efw:efw_panel → efw_size_of_government (treatment, publisher=fraser_efw, n=4557)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_pc_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → inflation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:26+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Uses WDI, WGI, Fraser EFW, and WIPO-ready sources. Later versions could use bank ownership or directed-credit datasets for a sharper treatment.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.