Pre-registration
In OECD country panels from 1990 to 2023, stricter regulation of temporary and fixed-term contracts predicts lower youth employment rates and slower recovery of youth employment after recessions. The directional claim is that a one-point increase in OECD temporary-contract EPL strictness is associated with at least a 0.8 percentage-point lower youth employment rate within three years, conditional on permanent-contract EPL, GDP growth, education enrolment, and active labour-market spending.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Refuted if temporary-contract EPL is non-negative for youth employment or non-positive for youth unemployment in the primary specification, or if recession-recovery local projections show no slower recovery in high-restriction country-years. If stricter temporary-contract rules only reduce temporary work while increasing permanent youth jobs, the claim is refuted rather than partially supported.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_temporary_contract_epl_youth_hiring threshold: beta_temp_epl_youth_employment <= -0.8pp per EPL point and beta_temp_epl_youth_unemployment > 0
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 38 countries · 1990 – 2023
- Evidence type
- associational
Two-way FE model with temporary-contract EPL and permanent-contract EPL entered jointly. Recession-recovery robustness estimates local projections of youth employment gaps at horizons one to three after recession troughs.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
youth_employment_rate outcome | ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2 | level_pct |
youth_unemployment_rate outcome | ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2 | level_pct |
youth_employment_recovery_gap outcome | ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2 | deviation_from_pre_recession_peak |
temporary_contract_epl_strictness treatment | oecd:EPL_TEMPtier 2 | level |
permanent_contract_epl_strictness treatment | oecd:EPL_REGtier 2 | level |
real_gdp_growth control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2 | level_pct |
tertiary_enrolment control | world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.ENRRtier 2 | level_pct |
almp_spending_gdp control | oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2 | level_pct_gdp |
regulatory_quality control | wgi:RQ.ESTtier 4 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — temporary_contract_restrictions_youth_hiring_panel
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:EPL_TEMP', 'oecd:EPL_REG']
Pre-registration
- Claim: In OECD country panels from 1990 to 2023, stricter regulation of temporary and fixed-term contracts predicts lower youth employment rates and slower recovery of youth employment after recessions. The directional claim is that a one-point increase in OECD temporary-contract EPL strictness is associated with at least a 0.8 percentage-point lower youth employment rate within three years, conditional on permanent-contract EPL, GDP growth, education enrolment, and active labour-market spending.
- Falsification rule: Refuted if temporary-contract EPL is non-negative for youth employment or non-positive for youth unemployment in the primary specification, or if recession-recovery local projections show no slower recovery in high-restriction country-years. If stricter temporary-contract rules only reduce temporary work while increasing permanent youth jobs, the claim is refuted rather than partially supported.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_temporary_contract_epl_youth_hiring
Estimate
- Error: no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:EPL_TEMP', 'oecd:EPL_REG']
Variables resolved
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A→ youth_employment_rate (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A→ youth_unemployment_rate (outcome, publisher=ilostat, n=10188)ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A→ youth_employment_recovery_gap (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG→ real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.ENRR→ tertiary_enrolment (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7217)oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG→ almp_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1404)wgi:RQ.EST→ regulatory_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5169)
Variables missing data
oecd:EPL_TEMP(treatment, name=temporary_contract_epl_strictness) — vintage not on diskoecd:EPL_REG(treatment, name=permanent_contract_epl_strictness) — vintage not on disk
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:03+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Candidate Worker C spec. The empirical challenge is to claims that labour-market control can protect insiders and entrants without reducing the entry margin.