IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel

OECD countries that deliver a larger share of low-income support through in-work benefits and earnings disregards, rather than through non-work-conditioned transfers, have higher employment rates among low-education adults and single parents without mechanically higher relative poverty.

The directional claim is that stronger in-work benefit intensity predicts a positive low-income employment coefficient and a non-positive relative-poverty coefficient after controlling for total social spending, childcare spending, and macroeconomic conditions.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A', 'oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment', 'oecd:IDD_relative_income_poverty']

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A', 'oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment', 'oecd:IDD_relative_income_poverty']

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 2001 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • In work benefit intensity
  • Non work cash transfer intensity
What we checked
  • Low education employment rate
  • Single parent employment rate
  • Relative poverty rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel
1007550250200120122023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show low_education_employment_rate across 38 sampled countries over 2001–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit e29141a · 2026-05-22T17:36:53Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:54:53Z

OECD countries that deliver a larger share of low-income support through in-work benefits and earnings disregards, rather than through non-work-conditioned transfers, have higher employment rates among low-education adults and single parents without mechanically higher relative poverty. The directional claim is that stronger in-work benefit intensity predicts a positive low-income employment coefficient and a non-positive relative-poverty coefficient after controlling for total social spending, childcare spending, and macroeconomic conditions.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if in-work benefit intensity is non-positive for low-education and single-parent employment, or if the positive employment coefficient is accompanied by a positive and significant relative-poverty coefficient after controlling for total social spending. If in-work benefits merely relabel existing employment without raising employment, the claim is refuted.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_in_work_benefits_low_income_employment
threshold: beta_in_work_employment > 0 and beta_in_work_relative_poverty <= 0 at p <= 0.10 where measured

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 2001 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Two-way FE model comparing in-work benefit intensity with non-work cash-transfer intensity while holding total social spending constant. Robustness checks estimate first differences around major EITC, Working Tax Credit, Prime d'activite, and similar reforms where local coding permits.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
low_education_employment_rate
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
single_parent_employment_rate
outcome
oecd:LFS_single_parent_employmenttier 2
level_pct
relative_poverty_rate
outcome
oecd:IDD_relative_income_povertytier 2
level_pct
in_work_benefit_intensity
treatment
oecd:TaxBEN_in_work_benefit_67awtier 2
level_pct_of_gross_wage
non_work_cash_transfer_intensity
treatment
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
total_social_spending_gdp
control
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
childcare_family_spending_gdp
control
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level_pct
rule_of_law
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — in_work_benefits_low_income_employment_panel

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A', 'oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment', 'oecd:IDD_relative_income_poverty']

Pre-registration

  • Claim: OECD countries that deliver a larger share of low-income support through in-work benefits and earnings disregards, rather than through non-work-conditioned transfers, have higher employment rates among low-education adults and single parents without mechanically higher relative poverty. The directional claim is that stronger in-work benefit intensity predicts a positive low-income employment coefficient and a non-positive relative-poverty coefficient after controlling for total social spending, childcare spending, and macroeconomic conditions.
  • Falsification rule: Refuted if in-work benefit intensity is non-positive for low-education and single-parent employment, or if the positive employment coefficient is accompanied by a positive and significant relative-poverty coefficient after controlling for total social spending. If in-work benefits merely relabel existing employment without raising employment, the claim is refuted.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_in_work_benefits_low_income_employment

Estimate

  • Error: no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A', 'oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment', 'oecd:IDD_relative_income_poverty']

Variables resolved

  • oecd:TaxBEN_in_work_benefit_67aw → in_work_benefit_intensity (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=874)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → non_work_cash_transfer_intensity (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → total_social_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → childcare_family_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)

Variables missing data

  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A (outcome, name=low_education_employment_rate) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment (outcome, name=single_parent_employment_rate) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:IDD_relative_income_poverty (outcome, name=relative_poverty_rate) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:53+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Candidate Worker C spec. It challenges redistribution claims that ignore work-conditioning design, while remaining open to the possibility that unconditional support performs equally well.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.