IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·workfare_conditionality_employment_effect

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the introduction of workfare or activity- conditional welfare programmes (requiring job search, training, or community work in exchange for benefits) predicts higher employment-to-population ratios and lower long-run unemployment relative to unconditional transfer regimes, controlling for cyclical conditions and institutional quality.

The directional claim is that workfare adoption is associated with at least a 1.5 percentage- point increase in the employment-to-population ratio within 5 years of implementation.

PARTIALengine/runs/workfare_conditionality_employment_effect

PARTIAL — coef=-0.6365, p=0.421 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether workfare programme indicator is actually linked to better or worse employment to population ratio from 1990 to 2020.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.6365, p=0.421 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 1990 to 2020, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Workfare programme indicator
  • Years since workfare
What we checked
  • Employment to population ratio
  • Long term unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/workfare_conditionality_employment_effect
1007550250199020052020USAGBRDEUFRAITAESPNLD
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show employment_to_population_ratio across 38 sampled countries over 1990–2020.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for workfare_conditionality_employment_effect. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/workfare_conditionality_employment_effect/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

8 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Degrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callDemocratic Socialism (Bernsteinian revisionism + modern)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callEco-Socialism / Red-Greenwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxian Political Economywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callModern Monetary Theorywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callPost-Keynesianwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 91b4750 · 2026-05-03T09:44:53Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:55:06Z

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the introduction of workfare or activity- conditional welfare programmes (requiring job search, training, or community work in exchange for benefits) predicts higher employment-to-population ratios and lower long-run unemployment relative to unconditional transfer regimes, controlling for cyclical conditions and institutional quality. The directional claim is that workfare adoption is associated with at least a 1.5 percentage- point increase in the employment-to-population ratio within 5 years of implementation.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if β1 (workfare) is positive and significant at p<0.10 for employment-to-population and negative for unemployment. PARTIAL if positive and significant for employment but not unemployment (participation gain without unemployment reduction). REFUTED if β1 is negative and significant at p<0.10. INFORMATIVE: excluding USA and UK should not eliminate the positive sign; if it does, the result is driven by Anglo- Saxon cases.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_workfare_conditionality_employment
threshold: β_workfare (employment/pop) > 0 at p<=0.10  AND β_workfare (unemployment) < 0 at p<=0.10  AND Ex-USA-UK robustness retains positive sign.

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 1990 – 2020
Evidence type
associational

Two-way FE panel with staggered adoption: employment = β0 + β1*workfare + β2*years_since + controls + FE. Robustness: (1) exclude USA and UK (dominant early adopters); (2) use synthetic control for each adopter vs matched non-adopters; (3) subsample by initial unemployment level; (4) control for ALMP spending intensity to separate conditionality from spending.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level
long_term_unemployment_rate
outcome
ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level
workfare_programme_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for USA from 1996; GBR from 1996; DEU from 2005; NLD from 2004; AUS from 1998; NZL from 1998; CAN from 199tier 5
indicator
years_since_workfare
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for USA from 1996; GBR from 1996; DEU from 2005; NLD from 2004; AUS from 1998; NZL from 1998; CAN from 199tier 5
years_since
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
institutional_quality
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level
working_age_population_share
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZStier 2
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
social_expenditure_gdp
control
world_bank_wdi:GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — workfare_conditionality_employment_effect

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.6365, p=0.421 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the introduction of workfare or activity- conditional welfare programmes (requiring job search, training, or community work in exchange for benefits) predicts higher employment-to-population ratios and lower long-run unemployment relative to unconditional transfer regimes, controlling for cyclical conditions and institutional quality. The directional claim is that workfare adoption is associated with at least a 1.5 percentage- point increase in the employment-to-population ratio within 5 years of implementation.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if β1 (workfare) is positive and significant at p<0.10 for employment-to-population and negative for unemployment. PARTIAL if positive and significant for employment but not unemployment (participation gain without unemployment reduction). REFUTED if β1 is negative and significant at p<0.10. INFORMATIVE: excluding USA and UK should not eliminate the positive sign; if it does, the result is driven by Anglo- Saxon cases.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_workfare_conditionality_employment

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.6365
  • Std error: 0.7914
  • p-value: 0.421
  • Observations: 805, countries: 38
  • Within R²: 0.000601
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → employment_to_population_ratio (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → long_term_unemployment_rate (outcome, publisher=ilostat, n=10188)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for USA from 1996; GBR from 1996; DEU from 2005; NLD from 2004; AUS from 1998; NZL from 1998; CAN from 1996; DNK from 1994; SWE from 2007; NOR from 2007; FIN from 2006 → workfare_programme_indicator (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=1178)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for USA from 1996; GBR from 1996; DEU from 2005; NLD from 2004; AUS from 1998; NZL from 1998; CAN from 1996; DNK from 1994; SWE from 2007; NOR from 2007; FIN from 2006 → years_since_workfare (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=1178)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • wgi:RL.EST → institutional_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS → working_age_population_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS → social_expenditure_gdp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=5156)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:55:06+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.