IESET.
Hypotheses·monetary·mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024

Egypt's three sequential currency-regime devaluations (November 2016, March 2022, March 2024) each followed a recurring pattern: an FX-shortage crisis, an IMF-anchored devaluation step, a brief inflation surge, and a partial reserve rebuild.

The pre- registered claim is that, in an event-study design pooling the three episodes, the six-month post-event window shows (a) FX reserves rise by at least 20% from the pre- event trough, (b) parallel-vs-official rate gap narrows by at least 50%, and (c) CPI inflation accelerates by at least 8 percentage points YoY at peak, with the inflation effect dissipating within 18 months. The null counter-claim is that the three episodes do not share a common dynamic — the response is regime-specific (e.g. the 2024 episode was rescued by the UAE Ras El Hekma deal rather than by floatation per se), and the pooled event study cannot reject heterogeneity.

PARTIALengine/runs/mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024

PARTIAL - annual WDI confirms repeated official devaluation and some reserve/inflation response, but reserve/inflation dynamics are heterogeneous and the parallel-rate gap is not locally loaded

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether devaluation event indicator is actually linked to better or worse official usd rate from 2014 to 2025.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. annual WDI confirms repeated official devaluation and some reserve/inflation response, but reserve/inflation dynamics are heterogeneous and the parallel-rate gap is not locally loaded

why it matters

This matters because monetary claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 2014 to 2025, using a event study design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Devaluation event indicator
What we checked
  • Official usd rate
  • Cpi inflation yoy
  • Fx reserves usd
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024
1007550250201420202025EGY
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show official_usd_rate across 1 sampled countries over 2014–2025.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-05-18T19:35:40Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Egypt's three sequential currency-regime devaluations (November 2016, March 2022, March 2024) each followed a recurring pattern: an FX-shortage crisis, an IMF-anchored devaluation step, a brief inflation surge, and a partial reserve rebuild. The pre- registered claim is that, in an event-study design pooling the three episodes, the six-month post-event window shows (a) FX reserves rise by at least 20% from the pre- event trough, (b) parallel-vs-official rate gap narrows by at least 50%, and (c) CPI inflation accelerates by at least 8 percentage points YoY at peak, with the inflation effect dissipating within 18 months. The null counter-claim is that the three episodes do not share a common dynamic — the response is regime-specific (e.g. the 2024 episode was rescued by the UAE Ras El Hekma deal rather than by floatation per se), and the pooled event study cannot reject heterogeneity.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if any of (a) average reserves at t+6 are not at least 20% above the pre-event trough, OR (b) the parallel-vs-official rate gap does not narrow by at least 50% on average across the three episodes by t+6, OR (c) the inflation peak is less than 8 ppts above the pre-event trend, OR (d) the three episodes are statistically heterogeneous at p < 0.05 (Wald test of equal coefficients), indicating the pooled pattern is not a single shared dynamic.

formal test & threshold
test:      pooled_event_study_with_homogeneity_test
threshold: pooled_reserves_t6 / reserves_t-1 >= 1.20 AND parallel_gap_t6 <= 0.50 * parallel_gap_t-1 AND inflation_peak - inflation_pre >= 8 ppts AND homogeneity_chi2_p > 0.05

Method

Template
event_study
Clustering
country
Sample
1 countries · 2014 – 2025
Evidence type
causal

Pooled event study with t=0 at each devaluation month, ±24-month window. Outcomes indexed to t=-1. Inverse-variance weighting across the three episodes. Robustness drops 2024 (UAE-deal-augmented) and re-runs as two-event pool. Secondary local- projections specification with horizon-specific impulse responses.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
official_usd_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:PA.NUS.FCRFtier 2
log_level
cpi_inflation_yoy
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
imf:PCPIPCHtier 2
yoy
fx_reserves_usd
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FI.RES.TOTL.CDtier 2
imf:RAFA_USDtier 2
log_level
current_account_share_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZStier 2
imf:BCA_NGDPDtier 2
level
devaluation_event_indicator
treatment
constructed:1 in months {2016-11, 2022-03, 2024-03}, 0 otherwisetier 5
event_dummy
brent_oil_price
control
fred:DCOILBRENTEUtier 1
log_level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level
emerging_market_vix
control
fred:VIXCLStier 1
level
tourism_arrivals
control
world_bank_wdi:ST.INT.ARVLtier 2
log_level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card - mena_egypt_floatation_episodes_2016_2024

Verdict: PARTIAL - annual WDI confirms repeated official devaluation and some reserve/inflation response, but reserve/inflation dynamics are heterogeneous and the parallel-rate gap is not locally loaded

Annual Event Gates

| Event | FX ratio | Reserve ratio | CPI acceleration | Gates | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | 2016 | 2.31 | 2.30 | +19.1 pp | FX, reserves, inflation | | 2022 | 1.96 | 0.83 | +28.7 pp | FX, inflation | | 2024 | 1.48 | 1.36 | -5.6 pp | FX, reserves, 2025 pending |

Caveat

The registered monthly six-month and parallel-market-rate gates are not locally loaded; this annual repair tests official FX, reserves, and CPI only.

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Data-gated on CBE FX reserve releases (monthly) and CAPMAS CPI (monthly). The 2024 Ras El Hekma deal ($35bn UAE FDI) is a confound that the spec flags but cannot cleanly remove. The hypothesis is most informative if 2016 and 2022 episodes share a pattern that 2024 does not — consistent with the "external rescue regime" story being qualitatively different from a market-led floatation.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.