IESET.
Hypotheses·fiscal·redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd

Among OECD and high-income peer economies from 1995 to 2023, tax-heavy redistribution predicts slower real GDP per capita growth once the tax take exceeds the sample median, controlling for initial income, working-age population share, trade openness, inflation, and government effectiveness.

The empirical mechanism is a threshold in marginal financing pressure: redistribution funded by high recurring tax shares should reduce growth through labour-supply, entrepreneurship, and capital-allocation margins if the market-incentive critique is correct.

PARTIALengine/runs/redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd

PARTIAL — coef=-0.1359, p=0.115 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.1359, p=0.115 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because fiscal claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 37 country or place units from 1995 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Tax revenue share
  • High tax regime
Possible pathway
  • Investment share
  • Labour force participation
What we checked
  • Real income per capita growth
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd
1007550250199520092023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_per_capita_growth across 37 sampled countries over 1995–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:33Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Among OECD and high-income peer economies from 1995 to 2023, tax-heavy redistribution predicts slower real GDP per capita growth once the tax take exceeds the sample median, controlling for initial income, working-age population share, trade openness, inflation, and government effectiveness. The empirical mechanism is a threshold in marginal financing pressure: redistribution funded by high recurring tax shares should reduce growth through labour-supply, entrepreneurship, and capital-allocation margins if the market-incentive critique is correct.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Supported if high_tax_regime is negative at p <= 0.10 and the above-median marginal tax coefficient is more negative than the below-median coefficient. Refuted if high_tax_regime is positive at p <= 0.10, or if the above-median marginal coefficient is not more negative than the below-median coefficient. A null result is partial.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_oecd_high_tax_growth_threshold
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
37 countries · 1995 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Estimate GDP-per-capita growth on tax_revenue_share, high_tax_regime, and controls with country and year fixed effects. The threshold claim is evaluated on high_tax_regime and on the marginal effect of tax_revenue_share above the median. Channel checks report whether investment_share or labour_force_participation attenuates the coefficient.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_per_capita_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
tax_revenue_share
treatment
world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
level
high_tax_regime
treatment
world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
indicator_above_sample_median
investment_share
channel
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
labour_force_participation
channel
world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZStier 2
level
log_initial_gdp_per_capita_ppp
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
lagged_log
working_age_population_share
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZStier 2
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
inflation
control
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level
government_effectiveness
control
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — redistribution_progressive_tax_growth_threshold_oecd

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.1359, p=0.115 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Among OECD and high-income peer economies from 1995 to 2023, tax-heavy redistribution predicts slower real GDP per capita growth once the tax take exceeds the sample median, controlling for initial income, working-age population share, trade openness, inflation, and government effectiveness. The empirical mechanism is a threshold in marginal financing pressure: redistribution funded by high recurring tax shares should reduce growth through labour-supply, entrepreneurship, and capital-allocation margins if the market-incentive critique is correct.
  • Falsification rule: Supported if high_tax_regime is negative at p <= 0.10 and the above-median marginal tax coefficient is more negative than the below-median coefficient. Refuted if high_tax_regime is positive at p <= 0.10, or if the above-median marginal coefficient is not more negative than the below-median coefficient. A null result is partial.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_oecd_high_tax_growth_threshold

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.1359
  • Std error: 0.08623
  • p-value: 0.115
  • Observations: 734, countries: 30
  • Within R²: -0.0394
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_per_capita_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS → tax_revenue_share (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4787)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS → high_tax_regime (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4787)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS → investment_share (decomposition_channels, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10428)
  • world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZS → labour_force_participation (decomposition_channels, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8302)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_initial_gdp_per_capita_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS → working_age_population_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → inflation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:33+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

This candidate is framed against redistribution claims by mechanism rather than ideology: the estimand is the growth cost of high recurring tax finance, not the moral status of redistribution.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.