IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019

Peru's 2001-2019 growth window — under five different administrations (Toledo, García II, Humala, PPK, Vizcarra) that all preserved the 1993 macroeconomic constitution (inflation-targeting central bank, fiscal-responsibility framework, open trade and capital account) — delivered cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of Latin America despite high political turnover.

The pre-registered claim is that institutional persistence (constraint on the executive to deviate from the macro framework) is the binding factor: log GDP-pc growth 2001-2019 exceeds the LATAM median by at least 0.20 log-points, AND the dispersion of macro outcomes (inflation, fiscal balance) under five administrations is lower than the within-administration dispersion of typical Latin American countries on a 5-year basis. The mechanism is that pre-committed institutions (central-bank independence, fiscal rule, open trade) outperform discretionary populist swings even when populist political pressure is high.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'context_inferred_treatment' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'context_inferred_treatment' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 10 country or place units from 2001 to 2024, using a panel fe design.

what was measured
What we checked
  • Log income pc constant
  • Cpi inflation yoy
  • Fiscal balance share income
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

0 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: no input vintages recorded.

Results

engine/runs/peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019
1007550250200120132024PERARGBRACOLECUMEXBOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show log_gdp_pc_constant across 10 sampled countries over 2001–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:59Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Peru's 2001-2019 growth window — under five different administrations (Toledo, García II, Humala, PPK, Vizcarra) that all preserved the 1993 macroeconomic constitution (inflation-targeting central bank, fiscal-responsibility framework, open trade and capital account) — delivered cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of Latin America despite high political turnover. The pre-registered claim is that institutional persistence (constraint on the executive to deviate from the macro framework) is the binding factor: log GDP-pc growth 2001-2019 exceeds the LATAM median by at least 0.20 log-points, AND the dispersion of macro outcomes (inflation, fiscal balance) under five administrations is lower than the within-administration dispersion of typical Latin American countries on a 5-year basis. The mechanism is that pre-committed institutions (central-bank independence, fiscal rule, open trade) outperform discretionary populist swings even when populist political pressure is high.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) cumulative log_gdp_pc_constant 2001-2019 (Peru minus LATAM median) is < 0.20, OR (b) within-Peru standard deviation of fiscal_balance_share_gdp 2001-2019 is not below the median LATAM within-country SD, OR (c) cpi_inflation_yoy in Peru 2001-2019 exceeds an annual mean of 4% (target ceiling).

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_plus_macro_dispersion_test
threshold: cumulative_log_gdp_pc(PER, 2001-2019) - cumulative_log_gdp_pc(LATAM_median, 2001-2019) >= 0.20 AND mean_cpi_inflation_yoy(PER, 2001-2019) <= 4.0 AND within_PER_SD_fiscal_balance(2001-2019) <= median_LATAM_within_SD_fiscal_balance(2001-2019)

Method

Template
panel_fe
Clustering
country
Sample
10 countries · 2001 – 2024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: panel_fe of log_gdp_pc on country and year FE plus Peru-indicator interacted with year. Secondary: variance-decomposition showing within-Peru macro dispersion across five administrations is below the LATAM median within-country dispersion. Tertiary: descriptive ranking of cumulative log GDP-pc growth 2001-2019 among the donor pool.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_gdp_pc_constant
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
cpi_inflation_yoy
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level
fiscal_balance_share_gdp
outcome
imf:GGXCNL_NGDPtier 2
level
wgi_government_effectiveness
outcome
wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.ESTtier 4
level
terms_of_trade
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level
copper_price
control
fred:PCOPPUSDMtier 1
log_level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — peru_post_fujimori_growth_2001_2019

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'context_inferred_treatment' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Peru's 2001-2019 growth window — under five different administrations (Toledo, García II, Humala, PPK, Vizcarra) that all preserved the 1993 macroeconomic constitution (inflation-targeting central bank, fiscal-responsibility framework, open trade and capital account) — delivered cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of Latin America despite high political turnover. The pre-registered claim is that institutional persistence (constraint on the executive to deviate from the macro framework) is the binding factor: log GDP-pc growth 2001-2019 exceeds the LATAM median by at least 0.20 log-points, AND the dispersion of macro outcomes (inflation, fiscal balance) under five administrations is lower than the within-administration dispersion of typical Latin American countries on a 5-year basis. The mechanism is that pre-committed institutions (central-bank independence, fiscal rule, open trade) outperform discretionary populist swings even when populist political pressure is high.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) cumulative log_gdp_pc_constant 2001-2019 (Peru minus LATAM median) is < 0.20, OR (b) within-Peru standard deviation of fiscal_balance_share_gdp 2001-2019 is not below the median LATAM within-country SD, OR (c) cpi_inflation_yoy in Peru 2001-2019 exceeds an annual mean of 4% (target ceiling).
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_plus_macro_dispersion_test

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'context_inferred_treatment' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc_constant (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → cpi_inflation_yoy (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)
  • imf:GGXCNL_NGDP → fiscal_balance_share_gdp (outcome, publisher=imf, n=8848)
  • world_bank_wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.EST → wgi_government_effectiveness (outcome, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
  • world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD → terms_of_trade (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=6478)
  • fred:PCOPPUSDM → copper_price (controls, publisher=fred, n=350)
  • fred:FEDFUNDS → us_policy_rate (controls, publisher=fred, n=730)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:59+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Tests whether macro-framework persistence under non-aligned political administrations produces a measurable growth premium.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.