IESET.
Hypotheses·fiscal·latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024

Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, countries that adopted numerical fiscal rules (Chile 2001, Brazil LRF 1999, Colombia 2011, Mexico Pemex-and-budget 2006, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) showed measurably better fiscal-balance dispersion and lower public-debt growth than non-adopters, conditional on commodity-cycle exposure.

The pre-registered claim is (a) panel-FE estimation of public-debt share of GDP on a fiscal-rule indicator shows a negative coefficient at p < 0.10, AND (b) the within-country standard deviation of fiscal-balance-share-of-GDP is reduced post-adoption, AND (c) cumulative growth post-adoption is not lower than the non-adopter comparison panel (i.e. fiscal rules do not impose a growth penalty in this window).

PARTIALengine/runs/latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024

PARTIAL — ATT=-22.28, p=8.45e-178, N=432, treated_countries=5; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether fiscal rule indicator is actually linked to better or worse gross general govt debt share income from 1995 to 2024.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. ATT=-22.28, p=8.45e-178, N=432, treated_countries=5; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

This matters because fiscal claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 18 country or place units from 1995 to 2024, using a did callaway santanna design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Fiscal rule indicator
What we checked
  • Gross general govt debt share income
  • Fiscal balance share income
  • Log income pc constant
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024
1007550250199520102024ARGBOLBRACHLCOLCRIDOM
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show gross_general_govt_debt_share_gdp across 18 sampled countries over 1995–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T14:42:43Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, countries that adopted numerical fiscal rules (Chile 2001, Brazil LRF 1999, Colombia 2011, Mexico Pemex-and-budget 2006, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) showed measurably better fiscal-balance dispersion and lower public-debt growth than non-adopters, conditional on commodity-cycle exposure. The pre-registered claim is (a) panel-FE estimation of public-debt share of GDP on a fiscal-rule indicator shows a negative coefficient at p < 0.10, AND (b) the within-country standard deviation of fiscal-balance-share-of-GDP is reduced post-adoption, AND (c) cumulative growth post-adoption is not lower than the non-adopter comparison panel (i.e. fiscal rules do not impose a growth penalty in this window).

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) fiscal-rule indicator coefficient on public-debt share is not negative at p < 0.10, OR (b) within- country fiscal-balance dispersion does not decline post-adoption, OR (c) cumulative log_gdp_pc growth post-adoption is below the non-adopter median (i.e. rules cost growth).

formal test & threshold
test:      callaway_santanna_did_plus_dispersion_test
threshold: fiscal_rule_coefficient on debt_share < 0 at p < 0.10 AND within_country_SD_fiscal_balance_post < within_country_SD_fiscal_balance_pre AND cumulative_log_gdp_pc_post_adoption(adopter_median) >= cumulative_log_gdp_pc_post_adoption(non_adopter_median)

Method

Template
did_callaway_santanna
Clustering
country
Sample
18 countries · 1995 – 2024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: Callaway-Sant'Anna staggered DiD with multiple treatment-adoption dates. Secondary: panel_fe with fiscal-rule indicator. Tertiary: within-country fiscal-balance dispersion pre/post adoption.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
gross_general_govt_debt_share_gdp
outcome
imf:GGXWDG_NGDPtier 2
level
fiscal_balance_share_gdp
outcome
imf:GGXCNL_NGDPtier 2
level
log_gdp_pc_constant
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
cpi_inflation_yoy
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level
fiscal_rule_indicator
treatment
constructed:country-year binary, 1 from adoption-year onward (Chile 2001, Brazil 1999, Colombia 2011, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006)tier 5
binary
terms_of_trade
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level
oil_price
control
fred:DCOILBRENTEUtier 1
log_level
wgi_government_effectiveness
control
wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — latam_extra_fiscal_rule_adoption_panel_1999_2024

Verdict: PARTIAL — ATT=-22.28, p=8.45e-178, N=432, treated_countries=5; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, countries that adopted numerical fiscal rules (Chile 2001, Brazil LRF 1999, Colombia 2011, Mexico Pemex-and-budget 2006, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) showed measurably better fiscal-balance dispersion and lower public-debt growth than non-adopters, conditional on commodity-cycle exposure. The pre-registered claim is (a) panel-FE estimation of public-debt share of GDP on a fiscal-rule indicator shows a negative coefficient at p < 0.10, AND (b) the within-country standard deviation of fiscal-balance-share-of-GDP is reduced post-adoption, AND (c) cumulative growth post-adoption is not lower than the non-adopter comparison panel (i.e. fiscal rules do not impose a growth penalty in this window).
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) fiscal-rule indicator coefficient on public-debt share is not negative at p < 0.10, OR (b) within- country fiscal-balance dispersion does not decline post-adoption, OR (c) cumulative log_gdp_pc growth post-adoption is below the non-adopter median (i.e. rules cost growth).

Estimate (Callaway-Sant'Anna staggered DiD, TWFE approximation)

  • coefficient: -22.276606752400745
  • std_error: 0.7835409033189007
  • p_value: 8.445637995694481e-178
  • n_obs: 432
  • n_countries: 18
  • r_squared_within: 0.7523673218390332
  • fe_entity: True
  • fe_time: True
  • cluster: country
  • method: Callaway-Sant'Anna TWFE fallback (linearmodels failed: No module named 'linearmodels')
  • n_treated_countries: 5
  • cohort_years: [1996, 2000]
  • dropped_controls_due_to_overlap: []

Variables resolved

  • imf:GGXWDG_NGDP → gross_general_govt_debt_share_gdp (outcome, n=8113)
  • imf:GGXCNL_NGDP → fiscal_balance_share_gdp (outcome, n=8848)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc_constant (outcome, n=14066)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → cpi_inflation_yoy (outcome, n=9066)
  • constructed: country-year binary, 1 from adoption-year onward (Chile 2001, Brazil 1999, Colombia 2011, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) → fiscal_rule_indicator (treatment, n=540)
  • world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD → terms_of_trade (controls, n=6478)
  • fred:FEDFUNDS → us_policy_rate (controls, n=1314)
  • fred:DCOILBRENTEU → oil_price (controls, n=720)
  • world_bank_wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.EST → wgi_government_effectiveness (controls, n=5168)

Generated by scripts/run_did_callaway_santanna.py at 2026-04-30T14:42:43+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Staggered-DiD design with explicit treatment timing.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.