IESET.
Hypotheses·housing·rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel

Stricter rent-price controls predict slower residential building-permit growth in European country panels.

The market mechanism is that binding rent ceilings reduce expected returns to new rental housing and maintenance; the redistribution counterclaim is that rent controls can transfer surplus to tenants without reducing future supply.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'rent_control_intensity' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Does the housing rule being tested make homes easier to build, rent, or afford, or does it quietly reduce supply and push costs elsewhere?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'rent_control_intensity' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

Housing policy affects rents, mobility, household budgets, and construction. The test looks for measurable effects rather than relying on slogans.

how the test works

It compares 28 country or place units from 2000 to 2024, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Rent control intensity
What we checked
  • Residential building permits index growth
  • Housing cost overburden rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel
1007550250200020122024AUTBELBGRCHECYPCZEDEU
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show residential_building_permits_index_growth across 28 sampled countries over 2000–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:15Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Stricter rent-price controls predict slower residential building-permit growth in European country panels. The market mechanism is that binding rent ceilings reduce expected returns to new rental housing and maintenance; the redistribution counterclaim is that rent controls can transfer surplus to tenants without reducing future supply.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if rent_control_intensity is negative for residential building-permit growth at p<=0.10 with at least 150 observations and 15 countries. REFUTED if rent_control_intensity is positive at p<=0.10 under the same sample floor. Otherwise PARTIAL or INCONCLUSIVE depending on data coverage.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
28 countries · 2000 – 2024
Evidence type
associational

Two-way fixed effects with country-clustered errors. The overburden-rate outcome is reported separately because rent controls can lower measured incumbent rents while reducing supply for future tenants.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
residential_building_permits_index_growth
outcome
eurostat:bldg_pi_lttier 1
annual_log_change
housing_cost_overburden_rate
outcome
eurostat:ilc_lvho07atier 1
level
rent_control_intensity
treatment
constructed:european_rent_control_indextier 5
level
log_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
population_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROWtier 2
level
real_interest_rate
control
world_bank_wdi:FR.INR.RINRtier 2
level
rule_of_law
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'rent_control_intensity' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Stricter rent-price controls predict slower residential building-permit growth in European country panels. The market mechanism is that binding rent ceilings reduce expected returns to new rental housing and maintenance; the redistribution counterclaim is that rent controls can transfer surplus to tenants without reducing future supply.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if rent_control_intensity is negative for residential building-permit growth at p<=0.10 with at least 150 observations and 15 countries. REFUTED if rent_control_intensity is positive at p<=0.10 under the same sample floor. Otherwise PARTIAL or INCONCLUSIVE depending on data coverage.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_rent_price_controls_building_permits_eu_panel

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'rent_control_intensity' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • eurostat:ilc_lvho07a → housing_cost_overburden_rate (outcome, publisher=eurostat, n=828)
  • constructed:european_rent_control_index → rent_control_intensity (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=700)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROW → population_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16672)
  • world_bank_wdi:FR.INR.RINR → real_interest_rate (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4694)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)

Variables missing data

  • eurostat:bldg_pi_lt (outcome, name=residential_building_permits_index_growth) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:15+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Eurostat and WDI are ready publishers. The main blocker for a runnable replication is transparent construction of the rent-control intensity index.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.