IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty

In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, broader collective-bargaining coverage does not impose a material unemployment penalty.

PARTIALengine/runs/oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty

PARTIAL — coef=+0.03241, p=0.663 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether bargaining coverage is actually linked to better or worse unemployment rate from 1990 to 2022.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=+0.03241, p=0.663 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 1990 to 2022, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Bargaining coverage
What we checked
  • Unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty
1007550250199020062022AUSAUTBELCANCHLCOLCRI
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show unemployment_rate across 38 sampled countries over 1990–2022.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

1 school list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Social Democraticwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:50Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, broader collective-bargaining coverage does not impose a material unemployment penalty.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED iff the 90% upper confidence bound for beta_bargaining_coverage is <= +0.10 unemployment-rate points per 1 pp coverage. REFUTED iff beta_bargaining_coverage >= +0.10 with p<0.10. PARTIAL otherwise if method-valid.

formal test & threshold
test:      oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty_twfe_1990_2022
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 1990 – 2022
Evidence type
associational

OLS with country and year fixed effects, clustered by country. This is an associational institutional panel, not a causal natural experiment.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
unemployment_rate
outcome
oecd:DSD_LFS_DF_LFS_INDICtier 2
level
bargaining_coverage
treatment
oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE_DSD_TUD_CBC_DF_CBC_1.0tier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+0.03241, p=0.663 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, broader collective-bargaining coverage does not impose a material unemployment penalty.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED iff the 90% upper confidence bound for beta_bargaining_coverage is <= +0.10 unemployment-rate points per 1 pp coverage. REFUTED iff beta_bargaining_coverage >= +0.10 with p<0.10. PARTIAL otherwise if method-valid.
  • Falsification test: oecd_collective_bargaining_unemployment_nonpenalty_twfe_1990_2022

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +0.03241
  • Std error: 0.07437
  • p-value: 0.663
  • Observations: 710, countries: 38
  • Within R²: -0.0246
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • oecd:DSD_LFS_DF_LFS_INDIC → unemployment_rate (outcome, publisher=oecd, n=2255)
  • oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE_DSD_TUD_CBC_DF_CBC_1.0 → bargaining_coverage (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1076)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:50+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Generated as Worker D OECD labour/distribution wave using only pinned OECD vintages already on disk.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.