IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty

In OECD TaxBEN panels since 2001, higher participation tax rates and effective marginal tax rates at the transition from non-work to low-wage work predict lower labour-force participation and employment among single parents and low-education adults.

The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point higher modelled benefit-cliff rate is associated with at least a 0.8 percentage-point lower single-parent or low-education employment rate within three years, after controlling for unemployment, childcare spending, minimum wages, and GDP growth.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67aw', 'oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67aw']

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

When minimum wages rise high relative to normal local pay, do lower-skill workers keep their jobs, or does hiring fall at the margin?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67aw', 'oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67aw']

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 2001 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Participation tax rate low wage single parent
  • Effective marginal tax rate low wage
What we checked
  • Single parent employment rate
  • Low education employment rate
  • Prime age lfp rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty
1007550250200120122023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show single_parent_employment_rate across 38 sampled countries over 2001–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:54:56Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In OECD TaxBEN panels since 2001, higher participation tax rates and effective marginal tax rates at the transition from non-work to low-wage work predict lower labour-force participation and employment among single parents and low-education adults. The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point higher modelled benefit-cliff rate is associated with at least a 0.8 percentage-point lower single-parent or low-education employment rate within three years, after controlling for unemployment, childcare spending, minimum wages, and GDP growth.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if participation-tax-rate and effective-marginal-tax-rate coefficients are non-negative for employment/LFP, or if a 10 percentage-point higher benefit-cliff rate implies less than minus-0.8 percentage points and p > 0.10 in the primary single-parent or low-education employment outcome. A poverty-reduction effect without employment decline is counted as refutation of the work-incentive penalty claim.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty
threshold: beta_cliff_10pp <= -0.8pp for single_parent_or_low_education_employment and p <= 0.10

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 2001 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Estimate two-way FE models with one- and three-year lagged TaxBEN cliff measures. Robustness checks separate participation tax rates from marginal rates, compare single-parent and childless-adult household types, and add country-specific trends.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
single_parent_employment_rate
outcome
oecd:LFS_single_parent_employmenttier 2
level_pct
low_education_employment_rate
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
prime_age_lfp_rate
outcome
ilostat:EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
participation_tax_rate_low_wage_single_parent
treatment
oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67awtier 2
level_pct
effective_marginal_tax_rate_low_wage
treatment
oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67awtier 2
level_pct
unemployment_rate
control
ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
childcare_family_spending_gdp
control
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
minimum_wage_relative_median
control
oecd:DSD_EARNINGStier 2
level_pct
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level_pct

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — oecd_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67aw', 'oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67aw']

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD TaxBEN panels since 2001, higher participation tax rates and effective marginal tax rates at the transition from non-work to low-wage work predict lower labour-force participation and employment among single parents and low-education adults. The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point higher modelled benefit-cliff rate is associated with at least a 0.8 percentage-point lower single-parent or low-education employment rate within three years, after controlling for unemployment, childcare spending, minimum wages, and GDP growth.
  • Falsification rule: Refuted if participation-tax-rate and effective-marginal-tax-rate coefficients are non-negative for employment/LFP, or if a 10 percentage-point higher benefit-cliff rate implies less than minus-0.8 percentage points and p > 0.10 in the primary single-parent or low-education employment outcome. A poverty-reduction effect without employment decline is counted as refutation of the work-incentive penalty claim.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_taxben_benefit_cliff_lfp_penalty

Estimate

  • Error: no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67aw', 'oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67aw']

Variables resolved

  • ilostat:EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → prime_age_lfp_rate (outcome, publisher=ilostat, n=10464)
  • ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → unemployment_rate (controls, publisher=ilostat, n=10188)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → childcare_family_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • oecd:DSD_EARNINGS@DF_MIN_REL_MED → minimum_wage_relative_median (controls, publisher=oecd, n=761)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:LFS_single_parent_employment (outcome, name=single_parent_employment_rate) — vintage not on disk
  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_EDU_RT_A (outcome, name=low_education_employment_rate) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:TaxBEN_participation_tax_rate_single_parent_67aw (treatment, name=participation_tax_rate_low_wage_single_parent) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:TaxBEN_effective_marginal_tax_rate_67aw (treatment, name=effective_marginal_tax_rate_low_wage) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:56+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Candidate Worker C spec. It tests a welfare-architecture mechanism rather than a general anti-transfer proposition.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.