Pre-registration
China's property-sector deleveraging shock 2020-2024 — triggered by the August 2020 "three red lines" policy on developer leverage, escalating through Evergrande's September 2021 default, Country Garden's 2023 liquidity crisis, and the persistent ghost-cities inventory overhang — produced a structural break in residential investment and a sustained drag on aggregate growth that is identifiable in real GDP, gross capital formation, and the household-consumption share of GDP. Post-shock (2021-2024) annualised real GDP growth is at least 2 percentage points per year below the 2010-2019 trend, and gross fixed capital formation share of GDP falls by at least 3 percentage points peak-to-trough.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if (a) mean real GDP-pc growth 2021-2024 is at least 2pp/yr below mean 2010-2019; AND (b) gross fixed capital formation share of GDP falls by at least 3pp from 2019 to 2024 trough. REFUTED if either condition reverses sign (post growth higher than pre, or capital formation share rising). INFORMATIVE (not gating): household-consumption share of GDP should NOT spike upward by >2pp (which would indicate rebalancing rather than pure drag).
formal test & threshold
test: china_property_bust_growth_capital_formation_break_2020_2024 threshold: PRIMARY: gdp_growth(2021-2024) - gdp_growth(2010-2019) <= -0.02 AND gcf_pct_gdp(2024) - gcf_pct_gdp(2019) <= -3.0. METHOD_VALID: WDI NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG and NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS available for CHN through 2024.
Method
- Template
descriptive- Clustering
none- Sample
- 1 countries · 2008 – 2024
- Evidence type
- descriptive
Pre-post structural break comparison around 2020 three-red-lines policy. Visualise as kinked trend line for GDP growth and GFCF share. Robustness: rolling 3-year windows around the break date.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
real_gdp_growth outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2 | level |
real_gdp_pc_growth outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2 | level |
gross_fixed_capital_formation_pct_gdp outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZStier 2 | level |
household_consumption_pct_gdp outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.PRVT.ZStier 2 | level |
post_three_red_lines_indicator treatment | constructed:indicator = 1 for years >= 2021tier 5 | indicator |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — china_extra_property_bubble_bust_2020_2024
Verdict: REFUTED — shape=pre_post, sign - OPPOSITE claim +; |Δ_log|=0.0358; threshold 2.0%, observed 3.6%
Pre-registration
- Claim: China's property-sector deleveraging shock 2020-2024 — triggered by the August 2020 "three red lines" policy on developer leverage, escalating through Evergrande's September 2021 default, Country Garden's 2023 liquidity crisis, and the persistent ghost-cities inventory overhang — produced a structural break in residential investment and a sustained drag on aggregate growth that is identifiable in real GDP, gross capital formation, and the household-consumption share of GDP. Post-shock (2021-2024) annualised real GDP growth is at least 2 percentage points per year below the 2010-2019 trend, and gross fixed capital formation share of GDP falls by at least 3 percentage points peak-to-trough.
- Falsification rule: PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if (a) mean real GDP-pc growth 2021-2024 is at least 2pp/yr below mean 2010-2019; AND (b) gross fixed capital formation share of GDP falls by at least 3pp from 2019 to 2024 trough. REFUTED if either condition reverses sign (post growth higher than pre, or capital formation share rising). INFORMATIVE (not gating): household-consumption share of GDP should NOT spike upward by >2pp (which would indicate rebalancing rather than pure drag).
- Falsification test: china_property_bust_growth_capital_formation_break_2020_2024
Comparison
- shape: pre_post
- country: CHN
- cut_year: 2020
- pre_mean: 42.443707129541345
- post_mean: 40.95172021163728
- delta: -1.4919869179040646
- log_delta: -0.035784842798971095
- n_pre: 12
- n_post: 5
Extracted threshold: {'percent': 2.0}
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS→ gross_fixed_capital_formation_pct_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9870)
Variables missing data
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG(outcome, name=real_gdp_growth)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG(outcome, name=real_gdp_pc_growth)world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.PRVT.ZS(outcome, name=household_consumption_pct_gdp)constructed: indicator = 1 for years >= 2021(treatment, name=post_three_red_lines_indicator)
Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-04-30T10:29:08+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
China-specific structural break around the 2020 "three red lines" policy. Property-sector contraction is large enough in scale to dominate the aggregate national-accounts series; no donor pool needed. Cross-checks via residential-investment share, capital formation, and consumption share insulate against any single series being smoothed.