IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·industrial_policy_corruption_interaction

Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/industrial_policy_corruption_interaction

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise grade a main-effect coefficient instead of the pre-registered interaction estimand. Add a treatment or decomposition variable with transformation/source/name marking the interaction, or use a bespoke replication script.

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined.

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 74 country or place units from 1990 to 2020, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Industrial policy intensity
  • Low rule of law dummy
What we checked
  • Real income growth
  • Corruption index
  • Total factor productivity growth
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

0 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: no input vintages recorded.

Results

engine/runs/industrial_policy_corruption_interaction
1007550250199020052020USADEUFRAGBRJPNKORCHN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_growth across 74 sampled countries over 1990–2020.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for industrial_policy_corruption_interaction. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/industrial_policy_corruption_interaction/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 5ce4495 · 2026-05-02T19:11:20Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:51Z

Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Falsified if the interaction coefficient between industrial policy intensity and low rule of law is not negative and statistically significant for GDP growth and corruption outcomes, or if industrial policy shows positive effects in low-rule-of-law samples comparable to high-rule-of-law samples.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_interaction_ip_x_rule_of_law
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
74 countries · 1990 – 2020
Evidence type
causal

Panel FE with interaction term between industrial policy intensity and rule-of-law dummy. Robustness via subsample analysis (high vs low WGI) and IV using legal origin as instrument for institutional quality.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
annual_pct
corruption_index
outcome
vdem:v2x_corrtier 4
level
total_factor_productivity_growth
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
annual_pct
industrial_policy_intensity
treatment
constructed:subsidies_and_state_aid_pct_gdptier 5
level_pct
low_rule_of_law_dummy
treatment
constructed:binary_wgi_rl_est_below_mediantier 5
binary
initial_gdp_per_capita
control
maddison:mpd2020tier 3
log_level
human_capital
control
owid:mean-years-of-schooling-long-run-1870tier 2
level
resource_rents
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZStier 2
level_pct

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — industrial_policy_corruption_interaction

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise grade a main-effect coefficient instead of the pre-registered interaction estimand. Add a treatment or decomposition variable with transformation/source/name marking the interaction, or use a bespoke replication script.

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.
  • Falsification rule: Falsified if the interaction coefficient between industrial policy intensity and low rule of law is not negative and statistically significant for GDP growth and corruption outcomes, or if industrial policy shows positive effects in low-rule-of-law samples comparable to high-rule-of-law samples.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_interaction_ip_x_rule_of_law

Estimate

  • Error: interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise grade a main-effect coefficient instead of the pre-registered interaction estimand. Add a treatment or decomposition variable with transformation/source/name marking the interaction, or use a bespoke replication script.

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • pwt:rtfpna → total_factor_productivity_growth (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • maddison:mpd2020 → initial_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=maddison, n=19706)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS → resource_rents (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=11504)

Variables missing data

  • vdem:v2x_corr (outcome, name=corruption_index) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed:subsidies_and_state_aid_pct_gdp (treatment, name=industrial_policy_intensity) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed:binary_wgi_rl_est_below_median (treatment, name=low_rule_of_law_dummy) — vintage not on disk
  • owid:mean-years-of-schooling-long-run-1870 (controls, name=human_capital) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:51+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

V-Dem corruption index available from 1900-2024. WGI rule of law from 1996. Industrial policy intensity from OECD STI, WTO notifications, and national budget documents.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.