IESET.
Hypotheses·trade·trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect

Argentina's manufacturing sector did not benefit durably from Mercosur (1991 onward) — manufacturing share of GDP fell over 1995-2019 from approximately 18% to 14%, a trajectory broadly consistent with non-Mercosur Latin American comparators (suggesting global deindustrialisation, not Mercosur-induced gain).

The claim is that Mercosur did not produce a measurable industrial-deepening effect for Argentina relative to Latin American non-bloc comparators.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect

SUPPORTED — ARG manufacturing-share change differed from comparators by only +1.6pp

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefClear support

In ordinary language

When countries open more of the economy to trade and competition, do people end up with better long-run income or productivity outcomes?

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. ARG manufacturing-share change differed from comparators by only +1.6pp

why it matters

This matters because trade claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 8 country or place units from 1990 to 2019, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What we checked
  • Manufacturing share of income
  • Log manufacturing value added
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

2 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: reproducible hash verified.

Results

engine/runs/trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect
1007550250199020052019ARGBRACHLCOLPERECUBOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show manufacturing_share_of_gdp across 8 sampled countries over 19902019.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

2 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-05-16T13:42:52Z

Argentina's manufacturing sector did not benefit durably from Mercosur (1991 onward) — manufacturing share of GDP fell over 1995-2019 from approximately 18% to 14%, a trajectory broadly consistent with non-Mercosur Latin American comparators (suggesting global deindustrialisation, not Mercosur-induced gain). The claim is that Mercosur did not produce a measurable industrial-deepening effect for Argentina relative to Latin American non-bloc comparators.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if Argentina manufacturing-share change 1995-2019 is within +/- 2 pp of comparator-mean change (no measurable Mercosur effect). PARTIAL if Argentina performs better than comparators by more than 2 pp. REFUTED if Argentina performs worse by more than 2 pp.

formal test & threshold
test:      descriptive_arg_mfg_share_vs_latam_comparators
threshold: PRIMARY: |delta_mfg_share(ARG) - delta_mfg_share(comparator_mean)| < 2 pp.

Method

Template
descriptive
Clustering
none
Sample
8 countries · 19902019
Evidence type
descriptive

Descriptive comparison. Argentina manufacturing-share-of-GDP trajectory vs Latin American non-Mercosur comparators (CHL, COL, PER, MEX). Tests whether Argentina's deindustrialisation pace differs from non-Mercosur peers.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
manufacturing_share_of_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.ZStier 2
level
log_manufacturing_value_added
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.KDtier 2
log

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — trade_lib_argentina_mercosur_industrial_effect

Verdict: SUPPORTED — ARG manufacturing-share change differed from comparators by only +1.6pp

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Argentina's manufacturing sector did not benefit durably from Mercosur (1991 onward) — manufacturing share of GDP fell over 1995-2019 from approximately 18% to 14%, a trajectory broadly consistent with non-Mercosur Latin American comparators (suggesting global deindustrialisation, not Mercosur-induced gain). The claim is that Mercosur did not produce a measurable industrial-deepening effect for Argentina relative to Latin American non-bloc comparators.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if Argentina manufacturing-share change 1995-2019 is within +/- 2 pp of comparator-mean change (no measurable Mercosur effect). PARTIAL if Argentina performs better than comparators by more than 2 pp. REFUTED if Argentina performs worse by more than 2 pp.
  • Falsification test: descriptive_arg_mfg_share_vs_latam_comparators

Comparison

  • shape: registered_argentina_mercosur_mfg_share_gate
  • source: world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.ZS
  • publisher: world_bank_wdi
  • country: ARG
  • primary_delta: {'country': 'ARG', 'start': {'country': 'ARG', 'year': 1995, 'value': 17.2467521148076}, 'end': {'country': 'ARG', 'year': 2019, 'value': 13.5408390702829}, 'delta_pp': -3.7059130445246993}
  • peer_deltas: [{'country': 'BRA', 'start': {'country': 'BRA', 'year': 1995, 'value': 14.5422791502638}, 'end': {'country': 'BRA', 'year': 2019, 'value': 10.3325005326579}, 'delta_pp': -4.209778617605901}, {'country': 'CHL', 'start': {'country': 'CHL', 'year': 1995, 'value': 19.2514284613681}, 'end': {'country': 'CHL', 'year': 2019, 'value': 8.96909548434668}, 'delta_pp': -10.28233297702142}, {'country': 'COL', 'start': {'country': 'COL', 'year': 1995, 'value': 14.7615046482786}, 'end': {'country': 'COL', 'year': 2019, 'value': 10.926657535177}, 'delta_pp': -3.834847113101599}, {'country': 'PER', 'start': {'country': 'PER', 'year': 1995, 'value': 15.3347247283038}, 'end': {'country': 'PER', 'year': 2019, 'value': 12.8493511674786}, 'delta_pp': -2.4853735608252006}, {'country': 'ECU', 'start': {'country': 'ECU', 'year': 1995, 'value': 22.1645697816292}, 'end': {'country': 'ECU', 'year': 2019, 'value': 12.6784857740305}, 'delta_pp': -9.4860840075987}, {'country': 'BOL', 'start': {'country': 'BOL', 'year': 1995, 'value': 16.7294171064214}, 'end': {'country': 'BOL', 'year': 2019, 'value': 11.2386028232878}, 'delta_pp': -5.4908142831336}, {'country': 'MEX', 'start': {'country': 'MEX', 'year': 1995, 'value': 21.1685474105437}, 'end': {'country': 'MEX', 'year': 2019, 'value': 19.8877542658522}, 'delta_pp': -1.280793144691497}]
  • peer_mean_delta_pp: -5.295717671996846
  • differential_change_pp: 1.5898046274721471
  • support_gate_abs_differential_lt_2pp: True
  • partial_gate_arg_better_gt_2pp: False
  • refute_gate_arg_worse_lt_minus_2pp: False

Extracted threshold: {'percent': 18.0}

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.ZS → manufacturing_share_of_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9698)
  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.KD → log_manufacturing_value_added (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8624)

Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-05-16T13:42:52+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.