IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel

Public social spending has a smaller employment penalty in OECD countries with higher government effectiveness.

The claim is that administrative capacity conditions whether large welfare states act as passive transfers or employment-compatible social insurance.

PARTIALengine/runs/oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel

PARTIAL — coef=+0.08454, p=0.29 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether welfare state size is actually linked to better or worse employment rate from 1996 to 2023.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=+0.08454, p=0.29 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 42 country or place units from 1996 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Welfare state size
  • Basic government quality
What we checked
  • Employment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel
1007550250199620102023AUSAUTBELBGRCANCHECHL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show employment_rate across 42 sampled countries over 1996–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:54:54Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Public social spending has a smaller employment penalty in OECD countries with higher government effectiveness. The claim is that administrative capacity conditions whether large welfare states act as passive transfers or employment-compatible social insurance.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED only if the interaction coefficient is positive at p<=0.10 and the implied social-spending marginal effect is less negative at high government effectiveness than at low effectiveness. REFUTED if the interaction is negative at p<=0.10.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
42 countries · 1996 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Primary estimand is welfare_state_size x government_effectiveness. A positive interaction means state capacity offsets the employment penalty associated with larger social spending.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
employment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
welfare_state_size
treatment
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level
government_effectiveness
treatment
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level
gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
log_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
regulatory_quality
control
wgi:RQ.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+0.08454, p=0.29 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Public social spending has a smaller employment penalty in OECD countries with higher government effectiveness. The claim is that administrative capacity conditions whether large welfare states act as passive transfers or employment-compatible social insurance.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED only if the interaction coefficient is positive at p<=0.10 and the implied social-spending marginal effect is less negative at high government effectiveness than at low effectiveness. REFUTED if the interaction is negative at p<=0.10.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_oecd_socx_welfare_employment_capacity_interaction_panel

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +0.08454
  • Std error: 0.07984
  • p-value: 0.29
  • Observations: 830, countries: 36
  • Within R²: 0.406
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS → employment_rate (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → welfare_state_size (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1559)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • wgi:RQ.EST → regulatory_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5169)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:54+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Variable name welfare_state_size intentionally triggers the existing SOCX aggregate slice in scripts/run_panel_fe.py.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.