IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase

Israel's 2008-2011 staged minimum-wage increase (from NIS 3,710 to NIS 4,100 monthly, with subsequent 2011 increase to NIS 4,300) did not produce a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline relative to a synthetic control of high-income OECD peers, while raising the bottom-quintile real wage by at least 5%.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.4791, |gap|/pre_sd=0.35, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

When minimum wages rise high relative to normal local pay, do lower-skill workers keep their jobs, or does hiring fall at the margin?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=+0.4791, |gap|/pre_sd=0.35, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 8 country or place units from 2000 to 2015, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Israel minimum wage 2008
What we checked
  • Employment to population ratio
  • Bottom quintile real wage index
  • Unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase
1007550250200020082015ISRGBRUSAIRLNLDDEUAUS
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show employment_to_population_ratio across 8 sampled countries over 2000–2015.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:30Z

Israel's 2008-2011 staged minimum-wage increase (from NIS 3,710 to NIS 4,100 monthly, with subsequent 2011 increase to NIS 4,300) did not produce a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline relative to a synthetic control of high-income OECD peers, while raising the bottom-quintile real wage by at least 5%.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Israeli employment rate is not statistically more negative than -0.5 pp at p<0.10 AND bottom-quintile real-wage gap > +5% by 2013. REFUTED if employment gap < -1.5 pp at p<0.10 (disemployment confirmed) OR bottom-quintile wage gap < +2% (non-compliance).

formal test & threshold
test:      Synth-DiD on Israeli employment rate and bottom-quintile real wage 2008-2013 vs OECD donor pool, placebo permutation at p<0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
8 countries · 2000 – 2015
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
bottom_quintile_real_wage_index
outcome
oecd:DSD_EARNtier 2
log
unemployment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
israel_minimum_wage_2008
treatment
constructed:indicator for 2008-Q3 Tripartite Agreement implementationtier 5
indicator
gdp_per_capita_real
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
real_effective_exchange_rate
control
bis:reer_broad_ilstier 2
log

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_reform_israel_2009_minimum_wage_increase

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.4791, |gap|/pre_sd=0.35, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Israel's 2008-2011 staged minimum-wage increase (from NIS 3,710 to NIS 4,100 monthly, with subsequent 2011 increase to NIS 4,300) did not produce a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline relative to a synthetic control of high-income OECD peers, while raising the bottom-quintile real wage by at least 5%.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Israeli employment rate is not statistically more negative than -0.5 pp at p<0.10 AND bottom-quintile real-wage gap > +5% by 2013. REFUTED if employment gap < -1.5 pp at p<0.10 (disemployment confirmed) OR bottom-quintile wage gap < +2% (non-compliance).

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: ISR
  • event_year: 2008
  • n_donors: 7
  • donor_weights (top): {'USA': 0.5382, 'AUS': 0.3887, 'DEU': 0.0732, 'GBR': 0.0, 'IRL': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 6.193962365970528
  • pre_period_sd: 1.3785940042563034
  • mean_post_gap: 0.47909031330853336
  • end_period_gap: -0.3563538060539093
  • post_period_years: [2008, 2015]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.75
  • n_placebos: 7
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (outcome, n=8106)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → gdp_per_capita_real (controls, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, n=10779)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:30+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Treatment is the 2008 Tripartite Agreement implementation. Israel is a useful test case because the minimum-wage rise was bundled with negotiated implementation rather than imposed unilaterally — closer to a Nordic-style social- partner outcome.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.