IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023

China's December-2022 abrupt reopening from dynamic-zero-COVID produced a partial-and-fading recovery in 2023 rather than a sharp pent-up-demand rebound.

By 2023H2, retail-sales YoY growth, manufacturing PMI, and youth unemployment all reverted toward weakness; full-year 2023 real GDP growth missed the IMF April-2023 5.5%+ consensus forecast by at least 0.5 percentage points net of the official print, and the 2024 carry-over growth rate stayed below the pre-COVID 2017-2019 trend.

PARTIALengine/runs/china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023

PARTIAL — shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.223; threshold 5.5%, observed 22.3%; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.223; threshold 5.5%, observed 22.3%; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 2017 to 2024, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Post reopening indicator
What we checked
  • Real income growth
  • Real income pc growth
  • Household consumption growth
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023
1007550250201720212024CHN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_growth across 1 sampled countries over 2017–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:28:11Z

China's December-2022 abrupt reopening from dynamic-zero-COVID produced a partial-and-fading recovery in 2023 rather than a sharp pent-up-demand rebound. By 2023H2, retail-sales YoY growth, manufacturing PMI, and youth unemployment all reverted toward weakness; full-year 2023 real GDP growth missed the IMF April-2023 5.5%+ consensus forecast by at least 0.5 percentage points net of the official print, and the 2024 carry-over growth rate stayed below the pre-COVID 2017-2019 trend.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if (a) 2023 full-year real GDP growth is below the 2017-2019 mean by at least 0.5pp; AND (b) 2024 real GDP growth does NOT recover to within 0.5pp of the 2017-2019 mean. REFUTED if 2023 growth exceeds the 2017-2019 mean (V-shape confirmed) AND 2024 sustains or accelerates above pre-COVID trend.

formal test & threshold
test:      china_zero_covid_exit_2023_recovery_trajectory
threshold: PRIMARY: gdp_growth(2023) <= gdp_growth_mean(2017-2019) - 0.005 AND gdp_growth(2024) <= gdp_growth_mean(2017-2019) - 0.005. METHOD_VALID: WDI NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG available for CHN through 2024.

Method

Template
descriptive
Clustering
none
Sample
1 countries · 2017 – 2024
Evidence type
descriptive

Pre-post comparison: 2017-2019 baseline vs 2023, 2024 outcomes. Tests recovery trajectory against pre-COVID trend rather than zero-COVID nadir. V-shape would show 2023 above-trend, fading would show 2023 below trend with no 2024 recovery.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
real_gdp_pc_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
household_consumption_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.PRVT.KD.ZGtier 2
pct_change_yoy
exports_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZGtier 2
level
post_reopening_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for years >= 2023tier 5
indicator

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — china_extra_zero_covid_exit_recovery_2023

Verdict: PARTIAL — shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.223; threshold 5.5%, observed 22.3%; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: China's December-2022 abrupt reopening from dynamic-zero-COVID produced a partial-and-fading recovery in 2023 rather than a sharp pent-up-demand rebound. By 2023H2, retail-sales YoY growth, manufacturing PMI, and youth unemployment all reverted toward weakness; full-year 2023 real GDP growth missed the IMF April-2023 5.5%+ consensus forecast by at least 0.5 percentage points net of the official print, and the 2024 carry-over growth rate stayed below the pre-COVID 2017-2019 trend.
  • Falsification rule: PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if (a) 2023 full-year real GDP growth is below the 2017-2019 mean by at least 0.5pp; AND (b) 2024 real GDP growth does NOT recover to within 0.5pp of the 2017-2019 mean. REFUTED if 2023 growth exceeds the 2017-2019 mean (V-shape confirmed) AND 2024 sustains or accelerates above pre-COVID trend.
  • Falsification test: china_zero_covid_exit_2023_recovery_trajectory

Comparison

  • shape: pre_post
  • country: CHN
  • cut_year: 2022
  • pre_mean: 6.722170153581954
  • post_mean: 5.3760011024274705
  • delta: -1.346169051154483
  • log_delta: -0.2234662336369777
  • n_pre: 5
  • n_post: 3

Extracted threshold: {'percent': 5.5}

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.PRVT.KD.ZG → household_consumption_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8533)

Variables missing data

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (outcome, name=real_gdp_growth)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG (outcome, name=real_gdp_pc_growth)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG (outcome, name=exports_growth)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for years >= 2023 (treatment, name=post_reopening_indicator)

Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-04-30T10:28:11+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Orthogonal to china_zero_covid_2022_2023 (which focused on the 2022 contraction phase). This hypothesis tests the 2023 recovery trajectory specifically: is the post-reopening rebound durable and V-shaped, or partial and fading? Cross-checks via PMI, retail, and trade insulate against single-series capture.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.