IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023

Japan's Abenomics programme (2012-12 onward, with three "arrows": aggressive monetary easing under Kuroda BOJ, flexible fiscal policy, growth-strategy structural reforms) produced a measurable inflation- expectations break and a labour-market tightening through 2019, but did NOT produce a sustained acceleration in real GDP-pc growth relative to the Japan 2002-2012 trend.

Real GDP-pc growth differential Japan 2013-2019 vs 2002-2012 is at most +0.3pp/yr (no major acceleration), while CPI inflation differential is at least +0.7pp/yr (inflation regime shift) AND unemployment rate falls by at least -1.5pp peak-to-trough.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023

SUPPORTED — shape=pre_post, sign matches claim +, |Δ_log|=0.634

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. shape=pre_post, sign matches claim +, |Δ_log|=0.634

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 2002 to 2023, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Post abenomics indicator
What we checked
  • Real income pc growth
  • Cpi inflation
  • Unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023
1007550250200220132023JPN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_pc_growth across 1 sampled countries over 2002–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

3 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Chicago School Monetarismwins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedEmpirical Pragmatist (the framework's house position)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supported

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-05-12T10:33:24Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Japan's Abenomics programme (2012-12 onward, with three "arrows": aggressive monetary easing under Kuroda BOJ, flexible fiscal policy, growth-strategy structural reforms) produced a measurable inflation- expectations break and a labour-market tightening through 2019, but did NOT produce a sustained acceleration in real GDP-pc growth relative to the Japan 2002-2012 trend. Real GDP-pc growth differential Japan 2013-2019 vs 2002-2012 is at most +0.3pp/yr (no major acceleration), while CPI inflation differential is at least +0.7pp/yr (inflation regime shift) AND unemployment rate falls by at least -1.5pp peak-to-trough.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

PRIMARY (dispositive, mixed-pattern): SUPPORTED if (a) real GDP-pc growth differential JPN 2013-2019 minus 2002-2012 is at most +0.003 (no major acceleration); AND (b) CPI inflation differential JPN 2013-2019 vs 2002-2012 is at least +0.007 (regime change); AND (c) JPN unemployment rate falls by at least 1.5pp peak-to-trough over 2012-2019. REFUTED if (a) shows >+1pp/yr growth acceleration (full-success) OR if both (b) and (c) fail (full-failure).

formal test & threshold
test:      japan_abenomics_inflation_labour_yes_growth_no_2013_2023
threshold: PRIMARY: gdp_pc_growth(JPN, 2013-2019) - gdp_pc_growth(JPN, 2002-2012) <= 0.003 AND cpi_inflation(JPN, 2013-2019) - cpi_inflation(JPN, 2002-2012) >= 0.007 AND unemployment_drop(JPN, 2012-2019) >= 1.5. METHOD_VALID: WDI NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS for JPN through 2019.

Method

Template
descriptive
Clustering
none
Sample
1 countries · 2002 – 2023
Evidence type
descriptive

Pre-post structural break on three outcome series. No donor pool; within-Japan structural-break design.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_pc_growth
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
cpi_inflation
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level
unemployment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
tfp_index
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
level
post_abenomics_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for JPN, year >= 2013tier 5
indicator

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — asia_japan_abenomics_retrospective_2013_2023

Verdict: SUPPORTED — shape=pre_post, sign matches claim +, |Δ_log|=0.634

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Japan's Abenomics programme (2012-12 onward, with three "arrows": aggressive monetary easing under Kuroda BOJ, flexible fiscal policy, growth-strategy structural reforms) produced a measurable inflation- expectations break and a labour-market tightening through 2019, but did NOT produce a sustained acceleration in real GDP-pc growth relative to the Japan 2002-2012 trend. Real GDP-pc growth differential Japan 2013-2019 vs 2002-2012 is at most +0.3pp/yr (no major acceleration), while CPI inflation differential is at least +0.7pp/yr (inflation regime shift) AND unemployment rate falls by at least -1.5pp peak-to-trough.
  • Falsification rule: PRIMARY (dispositive, mixed-pattern): SUPPORTED if (a) real GDP-pc growth differential JPN 2013-2019 minus 2002-2012 is at most +0.003 (no major acceleration); AND (b) CPI inflation differential JPN 2013-2019 vs 2002-2012 is at least +0.007 (regime change); AND (c) JPN unemployment rate falls by at least 1.5pp peak-to-trough over 2012-2019. REFUTED if (a) shows >+1pp/yr growth acceleration (full-success) OR if both (b) and (c) fail (full-failure).
  • Falsification test: japan_abenomics_inflation_labour_yes_growth_no_2013_2023

Comparison

  • shape: pre_post
  • country: JPN
  • cut_year: 2012
  • pre_mean: 0.5084225149789409
  • post_mean: 0.9587836387203262
  • delta: 0.45036112374138537
  • log_delta: 0.6343526137959972
  • n_pre: 10
  • n_post: 12

Extracted threshold: {'pp': 0.3}

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_pc_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → cpi_inflation (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9066)
  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • pwt:rtfpna → tfp_index (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for JPN, year >= 2013 → post_abenomics_indicator (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=22)

Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-05-12T10:33:24+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Mixed-prediction structure typical of Abenomics retrospectives: monetary regime change worked (inflation, labour market) but the "third arrow" structural reform did not deliver real-growth acceleration. Three primary tests, all from Japan time series.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.