IESET.
Hypotheses·energy·green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices

Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid).

The price gap is measurably associated with manufacturing-sector output divergence, with energy-intensive sectors (chemicals, metals, cement) relocating or contracting in high-price destinations. This operationalises the user's "green policy degrowth numbers" framing at the sector level rather than as a political slogan.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether aggressive green transition dummy is actually linked to better or worse log industrial electricity price from 2005 to 2023.

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

This matters because energy claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 12 country or place units from 2005 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Aggressive green transition dummy
What we checked
  • Log industrial electricity price
  • Log manufacturing value added
  • Energy intensive sector output share
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices
1007550250200520142023DEUFRAGBRBELNLDITAESP
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show log_industrial_electricity_price across 12 sampled countries over 20052023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit bae09ab · 2026-04-29T22:09:42Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:08Z

Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid). The price gap is measurably associated with manufacturing-sector output divergence, with energy-intensive sectors (chemicals, metals, cement) relocating or contracting in high-price destinations. This operationalises the user's "green policy degrowth numbers" framing at the sector level rather than as a political slogan.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) β_aggressive_green on log industrial electricity price is zero or negative at p<0.10 (should be positive: treatment raises prices), OR (b) the second-stage manufacturing VA effect is zero, OR (c) the pre-trend placebo detects spurious effects. Sensitivity drops 2020-2023 (war + COVID) — if the effect relies on those years, report honestly that the attribution is confounded by exogenous shocks rather than persistent policy-content effect.

formal test & threshold
test:      aggressive_green_transition_price_and_output_transmission
threshold: β_electricity_price > 0.10 log-points at p<0.10  AND β_manuf_va < -0.02 at p<0.10 via electricity price channel  AND pre-trend placebo |t| < 1.65  AND sensitivity drop-2020-2023 does not flip signs

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
12 countries · 20052023
Evidence type
causal

Staggered TWFE. β_aggressive_green identifies the average post-treatment divergence on industrial electricity prices. Second-stage regression of log manufacturing VA on log industrial electricity price (instrumented by the aggressive_green dummy) tests whether the price channel transmits to output. Known limitations: (1) Two-way FE with staggered treatment has Goodman-Bacon bias risks; Callaway-Sant'Anna robustness spec in v1.1. (2) Treatment-date coding is subjective (when did DEU's Energiewende "take effect" — 2011 formal decision, 2014 nuclear phase-out milestone, 2022 gas crisis?). The hypothesis uses 2011 as primary DEU treatment date, flags sensitivity. (3) COVID + Russia-Ukraine war are confounds 2020-2023; drop those years as sensitivity. Identification is clean only to the extent that the aggressive- treatment countries and the non-treated comparators share enough pre-treatment trend similarity. Pre-trend placebo is required.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_industrial_electricity_price
outcome
constructed:IEA industrial electricity price series + Eurostat NRG_PC_205 (industrial electricity prices), USD/MWh constant 2020. Fetier 5
log
log_manufacturing_value_added
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.CDtier 2
log_real
energy_intensive_sector_output_share
outcome
constructed:share of manufacturing value added from chemicals + metals + cement + paper (OECD STAN)tier 5
level
aggressive_green_transition_dummy
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for country-years with (a) legislated nuclear/coal phase-out AND (b) gas-indexed wholesale market AND (c) tier 5
indicator
log_population
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
urbanisation
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZStier 2
level

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_prices

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid). The price gap is measurably associated with manufacturing-sector output divergence, with energy-intensive sectors (chemicals, metals, cement) relocating or contracting in high-price destinations. This operationalises the user's "green policy degrowth numbers" framing at the sector level rather than as a political slogan.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) β_aggressive_green on log industrial electricity price is zero or negative at p<0.10 (should be positive: treatment raises prices), OR (b) the second-stage manufacturing VA effect is zero, OR (c) the pre-trend placebo detects spurious effects. Sensitivity drops 2020-2023 (war + COVID) — if the effect relies on those years, report honestly that the attribution is confounded by exogenous shocks rather than persistent policy-content effect.
  • Falsification test: aggressive_green_transition_price_and_output_transmission

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.CD → log_manufacturing_value_added (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9722)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for country-years with (a) legislated nuclear/coal phase-out AND (b) gas-indexed wholesale market AND (c) renewable-share target >30% by 2030. DEU (from 2011), GBR (from 2008 Climate Change Act binding), BEL, NLD qualify; FRA does not (retained nuclear); USA does not (grid more gas/renewables mix no firm phase-out); SWE/NOR do not (hydro baseload). Treatment date per country. → aggressive_green_transition_dummy (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=228)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTL → log_population (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14447)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS → urbanisation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)

Variables missing data

  • constructed: IEA industrial electricity price series + Eurostat NRG_PC_205 (industrial electricity prices), USD/MWh constant 2020. Fetcher pending for IEA. (outcome, name=log_industrial_electricity_price) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed: share of manufacturing value added from chemicals + metals + cement + paper (OECD STAN) (outcome, name=energy_intensive_sector_output_share) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:08+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Data readiness: - IEA industrial electricity price series — specialist fetcher needed - Eurostat NRG_PC_205 — Eurostat fetcher already shipped ✓ but specific series needs fetch - WDI manufacturing VA — ready ✓ - OECD STAN — not yet fetcher-ready v1 pre-registers; v1.1 runs when IEA + Eurostat energy-price series are added to baseline_pull.yaml and bootstrap.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.