IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·soviet_industrial_catch_up_1928_1940

Soviet industrial output grew faster than Western European averages during 1928-1940 under the first two Five-Year Plans, demonstrating primitive socialist accumulation's catch-up capacity.

PARTIALengine/runs/soviet_industrial_catch_up_1928_1940

partial — USSR cum-log growth +0.594 exceeds WE-mean +0.188 (differential +0.406) but falls short of the +0.50 log threshold the spec requires. Direction of the claim holds; magnitude does not.

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. USSR cum-log growth +0.594 exceeds WE-mean +0.188 (differential +0.406) but falls short of the +0.50 log threshold the spec requires.

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 6 country or place units from 1928 to 1940, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What we checked
  • Log real income long run
  • Log income pc long run
  • Industrial output index jst
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/soviet_industrial_catch_up_1928_1940
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Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

2 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Market Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z

Soviet industrial output grew faster than Western European averages during 1928-1940 under the first two Five-Year Plans, demonstrating primitive socialist accumulation's catch-up capacity.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

PRIMARY (dispositive): the hypothesis is SUPPORTED if the cumulative log-growth differential of Maddison MPD2020 total real GDP (`gdppc * pop`, 2011 PPP $) for the USSR (country_iso3 = `SUN`, falling back to `RUS` if absent) over 1928 -> 1940 minus the simple mean of the same statistic across the WE comparator panel (GBR, DEU, FRA, ITA) is at least +0.50 log points (~+65% advantage). PARTIAL if the differential is positive but below +0.50. REFUTED if the differential is <= 0. INFORMATIVE: differential against the WE+USA mean (a harder denominator — the US was largely insulated from the WE Depression timing); JST jst_r6 industrial-production index (`iy`) cumulative log-growth for the WE+USA panel as context (RUS is not in JST, so a strict like-for-like industrial-production comparison is a documented data gap). METHOD_VALID: USSR endpoints (1928 and 1940) present in Maddison AND at least 3 of the 4 WE comparators have both endpoints. If not, emit `inconclusive (data gap on maddison:mpd2020)`.

formal test & threshold
test:      ussr_vs_we_mean_cum_log_growth_1928_1940
threshold: PRIMARY: cum_log(USSR_GDP, 1928->1940) - mean(cum_log(WE_GDP, 1928->1940)) >= 0.50.

Method

Template
descriptive
Clustering
none
Sample
6 countries · 1928 – 1940
Evidence type
descriptive

Descriptive comparison of USSR industrial-output growth rates 1928-1940 against Western European averages over the same period. Reports cumulative log-growth differential; tests whether five-year-plan-era Soviet industry grew measurably faster than peer Western Europe.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_real_gdp_long_run
outcome
maddison:gdp_ppptier 3
log
log_gdp_pc_long_run
outcome
maddison:gdppc_ppptier 3
log
industrial_output_index_jst
outcome
jst:industrial_productiontier 3
log
log_population
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2
log

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Soviet industrial catch-up, 1928–1940

Verdict: partial — USSR cum-log growth +0.594 exceeds WE-mean +0.188 (differential +0.406) but falls short of the +0.50 log threshold the spec requires. Direction of the claim holds; magnitude does not.

Headline numbers

  • Series: Maddison MPD2020 total real GDP = gdppc x pop (2011 PPP $).
  • USSR (SUN) GDP 1928 → 1940: 369,683,496 → 669,629,490 (cumulative +0.594 log; annualised +5.08%/yr).
  • WE comparator panel (DEU, FRA, GBR, ITA) mean cumulative log-growth: +0.188 (annualised +1.58%/yr).
  • USA cumulative log-growth: +0.139 (annualised +1.17%/yr).
  • Primary differential (USSR – WE-mean): +0.406 log points (threshold ≥ +0.50).
  • Differential vs WE+USA mean: +0.416 log points (harder denominator — US was largely insulated from WE Depression timing).

WE comparator trajectories 1928 → 1940 (Maddison)

| Country | GDP 1928 | GDP 1940 | cum log | annualised | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | DEU | 419,777,967 | 601,419,020 | +0.360 | +3.04% | | FRA | 289,936,150 | 264,163,000 | -0.093 | -0.77% | | GBR | 389,190,542 | 527,013,728 | +0.303 | +2.56% | | ITA | 188,592,898 | 226,094,759 | +0.181 | +1.52% |

JST industrial-production index (WE+USA only — RUS not in panel)

| Country | cum log iy | annualised | |---|---:|---:| | FRA | -0.199 | -1.65% | | GBR | -0.234 | -1.93% | | ITA | +0.002 | +0.02% | | USA | -0.117 | -0.97% |

WE-only JST iy panel mean: -0.144. WE+USA JST iy panel mean: -0.137. JST has no USSR row, so a strict industrial-production like-for-like comparison cannot be made from the parquet vintages.

Threshold applied

  • PRIMARY: cum_log(USSR, 1928→1940) − mean(cum_log(WE, 1928→1940)) >= 0.50.
  • PARTIAL: differential positive but below threshold (direction holds, magnitude does not).
  • REFUTED: differential ≤ 0.

Caveats not adjusted for in the headline

  • Maddison's USSR series for 1928-40 is itself the Davies-Wheatcroft / Markevich-Harrison reconstruction debate output, not an independent measurement. Different reconstructions give USSR 1928→1940 log growth between roughly +0.7 and +1.0; treat the level as load-bearing only at one significant figure.
  • The WE base is the Great Depression. Picking 1928 = peak and 1940 = early-rearmament-recovery flatters any fast-industrialiser comparison; a 1928→1937 window narrows the gap.
  • The 1932-33 famine, gulag labour, and consumption collapse (real wages, retail goods availability) are not in the headline. The claim is output growth, not welfare growth; this run scores the literal claim, not the broader policy verdict.

Sources

  • Maddison Project Database 2020 (vintage mpd2020@2026-04-26T134326Z.parquet).
  • Jordà-Schularick-Taylor R6 (vintage jst_r6@2026-04-26T134334Z.parquet) — WE+USA only.

Notes

Seeded from a Marxist-Leninist claim that 1928-40 Soviet industrial output outgrew Western European averages under the first two Five-Year Plans. Cross-country descriptive comparison; 1930s output indices are well-known to be reconstruction-dependent and require human review.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.