Pre-registration
Export promotion combined with domestic competition policy outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection (entry barriers, state aid to incumbents, preferential procurement) in raising real export growth and manufacturing TFP, in a broad-country panel 1990-2020. The directional claim is that the interaction between export-promotion intensity and competition-policy stringency is positive for export growth and TFP, while the interaction between export promotion and protection intensity is insignificant or negative.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
SUPPORTED if β1 (export promotion × competition) is positive and significant at p<0.10 while β2 (export promotion × protection) is insignificant or negative. PARTIAL if both are positive but β1 > β2. REFUTED if β2 is positive and significantly larger than β1, or if both are insignificant. INFORMATIVE: excluding China and Korea should not eliminate β1; if it does, the result is driven by two East Asian developmental states.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_export_promotion_competition_vs_protection_interaction threshold: β_export_x_competition > 0 at p<=0.10 AND β_export_x_protection p >= 0.10 or coefficient <= 0 AND Ex-China-Korea robustness retains sign of β_export_x_competition.
Method
- Template
panel_fe_decomposition- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 37 countries · 1990 – 2020
- Evidence type
- associational
Two-way FE panel with two interaction terms: outcome = β0 + β1*export promotion × competition + β2*export promotion × protection + β3*export promotion + β4*competition + β5*protection + controls + FE. The comparison of interest is β1 versus β2. Mechanism decomposition via export diversification and manufacturing TFP channels. Robustness: (1) exclude China and Korea (dominant export-promotion cases); (2) use 5-year non-overlapping averages; (3) IV for export promotion using shift-share based on world demand growth by sector.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
real_export_growth outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZGtier 2 | annual_log_change |
manufacturing_tfp_growth outcome | constructed:UNIDO INDSTAT or OECD STAN sectoral TFPtier 5 | annual_log_change |
export_promotion_intensity treatment | constructed:export promotion agency budget / GDP + export financing / GDP + number of trade missions (ITC / World Bank TPR)tier 5 | z_score_composite |
domestic_protection_index treatment | oecd_pmr:barriers_to_trade_and_investmenttier 4 | level |
domestic_competition_index treatment | oecd_pmr:overall_pmrtier 4 | inverted_scale |
initial_log_gdp_per_capita control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | log |
real_effective_exchange_rate control | imf:reertier 2 | log_change |
trade_openness control | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
human_capital_index control | pwt:hctier 3 | level |
infrastructure_quality control | wgi:GE.ESTtier 4 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — export_promotion_without_protection
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (22)
Pre-registration
- Claim: Export promotion combined with domestic competition policy outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection (entry barriers, state aid to incumbents, preferential procurement) in raising real export growth and manufacturing TFP, in a broad-country panel 1990-2020. The directional claim is that the interaction between export-promotion intensity and competition-policy stringency is positive for export growth and TFP, while the interaction between export promotion and protection intensity is insignificant or negative.
- Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if β1 (export promotion × competition) is positive and significant at p<0.10 while β2 (export promotion × protection) is insignificant or negative. PARTIAL if both are positive but β1 > β2. REFUTED if β2 is positive and significantly larger than β1, or if both are insignificant. INFORMATIVE: excluding China and Korea should not eliminate β1; if it does, the result is driven by two East Asian developmental states.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_export_promotion_competition_vs_protection_interaction
Estimate
- Error: insufficient observations after listwise deletion (22)
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG→ real_export_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8722)oecd_pmr:overall_pmr→ domestic_competition_index (treatment, publisher=oecd_pmr, n=105)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ initial_log_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)pwt:hc→ human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)wgi:GE.EST→ infrastructure_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
Variables missing data
constructed: UNIDO INDSTAT or OECD STAN sectoral TFP(outcome, name=manufacturing_tfp_growth) — vintage not on diskconstructed: export promotion agency budget / GDP + export financing / GDP + number of trade missions (ITC / World Bank TPR)(treatment, name=export_promotion_intensity) — vintage not on diskoecd_pmr:barriers_to_trade_and_investment(treatment, name=domestic_protection_index) — vintage not on diskimf_weo:reer(controls, name=real_effective_exchange_rate) — vintage not on disk
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:38+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Data readiness: - ITC Trade Facilitation / export promotion indicators (pending) - OECD PMR barriers to trade and investment, overall PMR (ready for subset) - WDI real export growth, trade openness, GDP pc (ready) - IMF WEO REER (ready) - PWT hc, WGI GE.EST (ready) - UNIDO INDSTAT / OECD STAN manufacturing TFP (pending)