IESET.
Hypotheses·fiscal·redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd

In OECD countries from 1990 to 2023, transfer-heavy welfare states predict lower prime-age labour-force participation when transfer expansion is not accompanied by strong work incentives, after controlling for income level, female education, ageing, unemployment, and macro shocks.

The mechanism tested is the substitution and participation margin: redistribution can reduce durable poverty if it protects work attachment, but should weaken it when benefit design makes non-work relatively more attractive.

PARTIALengine/runs/redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd

PARTIAL — coef=-0.004252, p=0.958 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.004252, p=0.958 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because fiscal claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 37 country or place units from 1990 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Social spending share
  • Tax revenue share
What we checked
  • Labour force participation total
  • Employment to population ratio
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd
1007550250199020072023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show labour_force_participation_total across 37 sampled countries over 1990–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:33Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In OECD countries from 1990 to 2023, transfer-heavy welfare states predict lower prime-age labour-force participation when transfer expansion is not accompanied by strong work incentives, after controlling for income level, female education, ageing, unemployment, and macro shocks. The mechanism tested is the substitution and participation margin: redistribution can reduce durable poverty if it protects work attachment, but should weaken it when benefit design makes non-work relatively more attractive.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Supported if social_spending_share is negative at p <= 0.10 at below-median work_incentive_proxy and the interaction with work_incentive_proxy is positive. Refuted if social_spending_share is positive at below-median work incentives, or if the interaction is negative at p <= 0.10. Otherwise partial.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
37 countries · 1990 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Primary specification includes social_spending_share, work_incentive_proxy, and their interaction. The mechanism is supported only if social spending has a more negative marginal association with participation when work incentives are weak.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
labour_force_participation_total
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZStier 2
level
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
social_spending_share
treatment
oecd:OECD.SOCXtier 2
level
tax_revenue_share
treatment
world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
level
work_incentive_proxy
treatment
fraser_efw:size_of_governmenttier 4
level
log_gdp_per_capita_ppp
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
female_tertiary_attainment
control
world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.CUAT.BA.FE.ZStier 2
level
old_age_dependency_ratio
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.DPND.OLtier 2
level
unemployment_rate
control
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
real_gdp_per_capita_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — redistribution_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr_oecd

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.004252, p=0.958 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD countries from 1990 to 2023, transfer-heavy welfare states predict lower prime-age labour-force participation when transfer expansion is not accompanied by strong work incentives, after controlling for income level, female education, ageing, unemployment, and macro shocks. The mechanism tested is the substitution and participation margin: redistribution can reduce durable poverty if it protects work attachment, but should weaken it when benefit design makes non-work relatively more attractive.
  • Falsification rule: Supported if social_spending_share is negative at p <= 0.10 at below-median work_incentive_proxy and the interaction with work_incentive_proxy is positive. Refuted if social_spending_share is positive at below-median work incentives, or if the interaction is negative at p <= 0.10. Otherwise partial.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_transfer_work_incentive_lfpr

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.004252
  • Std error: 0.08069
  • p-value: 0.958
  • Observations: 379, countries: 30
  • Within R²: -0.619
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZS → labour_force_participation_total (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8302)
  • world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS → employment_to_population_ratio (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS → tax_revenue_share (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4787)
  • fraser_efw:size_of_government → work_incentive_proxy (treatment, publisher=fraser_efw, n=4682)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_per_capita_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.CUAT.BA.FE.ZS → female_tertiary_attainment (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=1401)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.DPND.OL → old_age_dependency_ratio (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16935)
  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=6874)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_per_capita_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:OECD.SOCX (treatment, name=social_spending_share) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:33+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Intended as a mechanism test for redistribution-heavy poverty claims: the key question is whether transfer design preserves labour-market attachment, not whether transfers reduce measured poverty in the same year.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.