IESET.
Movements·argentina_default_collapse_2001_2002

Argentina 2001–2002 default + convertibility collapse

ARG·20012002·Rotating presidents during collapse (De la Rúa, Rodríguez Saá, Duhalde)
Leaders: Fernando de la Rúa · Adolfo Rodríguez Saá · Eduardo Duhalde
positionsaustrian

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Sovereign default December 2001 on ~US$100bn debt. Corralito banking freeze. Convertibility Law abandoned Jan 2002, peso depreciation to ~4/USD within weeks. Pesification of domestic-currency debts + dollar- indexation losses. GDP contracted ~11% in 2002; unemployment peaked ~25%. Framework codes as a failure-movement distinct from preceding Menem convertibility (the regime collapse vs the regime itself). Recovery 2003+ via Kirchner-era expansion (separate movement).

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · strong
weaker property rights
Corralito + pesification violated deposit contracts.
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · strong
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
Convertibility anchor abandoned; BCRA re-politicised.
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · strong
higher spending share
Emergency welfare programmes (Jefes y Jefas) during collapse.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
sovereign_default_output_effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned

References