IESET.
Movements·austria_kurz_ovp_2017_2021

Kurz OeVP-FPOe then OeVP-Greens 2017-2021

AUT·2017 – 2021·OeVP-FPOe (Dec 2017 - May 2019); caretaker (2019-2020); OeVP-Gruene (Jan 2020 - Dec 2021)
Leaders: Sebastian Kurz (Chancellor, OeVP, 2017-2019 and 2020-2021) · Heinz-Christian Strache (Vice-Chancellor, FPOe, to May 2019) · Werner Kogler (Vice-Chancellor, Gruene, from Jan 2020) · Hartwig Loeger (Finance Minister, OeVP, 2017-2019) · Gernot Bluemel (Finance Minister, OeVP, 2020-2021)
positionsordoliberalsocial_democraticempirical_pragmatist

Doctrine — stated goals and content

OeVP migration-restrictionist centre-right doctrine under Sebastian Kurz's personalised takeover of the OeVP (the 'turquoise' rebrand from 2017), first as the senior partner in an OeVP-FPOe right-populist coalition prioritising migration tightening, family-transfer expansion, and a working-time liberalisation, then — after the May 2019 Ibiza-Video collapse of Strache and the FPOe — reconstituted in January 2020 as an OeVP-Greens 'turquoise-green' coalition combining OeVP migration and fiscal lines with Greens climate agenda. Left-right axis: centre-right with a right-populist flank in phase 1, shifting to centre-right with ecological modernisation in phase 2. Core phase-1 enactments: 12-Stunden- Tag liberalisation of the Arbeitszeitgesetz (September 2018, raising daily max to 12h and weekly max to 60h by individual voluntary agreement), Familienbonus Plus (EUR 1,500 per child income-tax credit from 2019), Indexierung of the Familienbeihilfe for children living abroad (2019, later struck down by CJEU 2022), tightening of Section 58c asylum law and border-control rhetoric ('Balkanroute schliessen'). Phase 2 under Greens: COVID-19 response (Kurzarbeit Phase 1-4, hardship fund, Corona- Hilfspaket totalling ~EUR 50bn by end-2021), first CO2-price legislation programmed for 2022, Oekostromgesetz reforms. Phase 1 collapsed on the 17 May 2019 Ibiza-Video publication; phase 2 ended with Kurz's 9 October 2021 resignation under Inseraten-Affaere prosecutorial pressure. Coherence judgement: the phase-1 OeVP-FPOe coalition executed its stated programme with unusual discipline for a 16-month term; phase 2 was crisis-dominated; across both, Kurz's personalist style was a distinctive institutional feature of this movement.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
increased · moderate
more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)
12-Stunden-Tag / 60-Stunden-Woche amendment raised statutory daily and weekly maxima under voluntary agreement — largest Arbeitszeitgesetz liberalisation since 1997.
↓
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
decreased · weak
less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)
Familienbonus Plus EUR 1,500/child tax credit and bracket adjustments reduced effective middle-income rates; no top-rate movement.
↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
Familienbonus Plus and COVID Kurzarbeit Phase 1-4 pushed transfers/GDP sharply upward 2020-2021, though from a tax-credit architecture (Phase 1).
↓
immigration openness
regulatory.immigration_openness
Immigration policy openness — work visas, family reunification, asylum processing, border enforcement posture.
decreased · strong
more restrictive (lower caps, tighter enforcement)
Section 58c asylum tightening, 'Balkanroute' stance, Familienbeihilfe indexation (later CJEU-struck), mandatory German and values courses.
↑
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · strong
higher spending share
COVID emergency spending (Kurzarbeit, hardship fund, Corona-Hilfspaket ~EUR 50bn) dominated phase 2; phase 1 was approximately fiscally neutral.
↑
environmental stringency
regulatory.environmental_stringency
Environmental regulation stringency — emissions caps, standards, phase-out mandates, carbon pricing, renewable portfolio standards.
increased · weak
more stringent environmental rules
Phase-2-only: first national CO2 price drafted for 2022 implementation (realised under Nehammer), Oekostromgesetz amendments, coal-exit finalised.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
working_time_liberalisation_hours_worked_effect
not yet written
migration_tightening_labour_market_impact
not yet written
covid_kurzarbeit_employment_preservation

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
ordoliberal
Applauded working-time liberalisation; sceptical of family-transfer design.
opposed
social_democratic
12-hour day and Familienbeihilfe indexation attacked as anti-worker and anti-EU-worker.
partial
empirical_pragmatist

References

Notes

Nationalrat seat distribution at OeVP-FPOe formation (Dec 2017): OeVP 62 (31.5%), FPOe 51 (26.0%) — total 113/183 = 61.7%. After Sep 2019 snap election (triggered by Ibiza): OeVP 71 (37.5%, +6pp, strongest OeVP result since 2002), Gruene 26 (13.9%, returning after 2017 ejection), FPOe 31 (16.2%, -9.8pp). Kurz personal approval peaked >60% in 2018 (pre-Ibiza) and again in mid-2020 during COVID; fell sharply from Oct 2021. Kurz resigned as Chancellor 9 Oct 2021 after Staatsanwaltschaft raids over the Inseraten-Affaere (alleged state-funded favourable polling in OeVP press); Schallenberg served as caretaker Chancellor Oct-Dec 2021 before Nehammer took over. The OeVP coalition persisted continuously from 2017 through 2025 across three Chancellors (Kurz, Schallenberg, Nehammer), but the coalition partner changed (FPOe -> Gruene) in 2020. This movement entry bounds the Kurz-personalist phase; Nehammer's continuation is treated as a successor movement.