Movements · pinochet_chicago_boys_1975_1990 Chilean Chicago Boys market reforms under Pinochet CHL · 1975 – 1990· Military dictatorship under Pinochet + Chicago-trained technocrats
Leaders: Augusto Pinochet (junta leader) · Sergio de Castro (Finance Minister 1976-1982) · José Piñera (Labour+Social Security 1978-1980)
Doctrine — stated goals and content Radical liberalisation programme 1975-1982: trade opening (tariffs from ~94% to 10%), SOE privatisations, unilateral FX opening, AFP pension privatisation 1981 (separately coded), fiscal discipline, banking liberalisation. 1982 crisis produced severe recession; recovery 1985+ continued liberalisation under more orthodox framework. Framework codes as market-oriented content under authoritarian regime — an important boundary case where institutional quality (rule of law, democratic accountability) was NEGATIVE while economic content was market-oriented. Outcome: growth acceleration post-1985 but with heavy distributional cost and democratic deficit.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes ↑
trade openness → regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · strong
more open trade
↑
product market competition → regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · strong
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Extensive privatisation + entry-barrier removal.
↓
financial deregulation → regulatory.financial_deregulation
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
decreased · strong
looser financial regulation
Banking rules liberalised pre-1982 crisis; re-tightened post-crisis.
↓
rule of law → institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Authoritarian regime with severe human rights violations — distinct from market-content coding.
↓
spending level → fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
decreased · strong
lower spending share
Policies enacted · chile_trade_opening_1975_1979 · chile_soe_privatisations_1975_1989 · chile_fx_opening_1976 · chile_banking_liberalisation_1977 · chile_afp_1981 What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.
not yet written market_reform_growth_effect_authoritarian_vs_democratic
Schools of thought aligned or opposed References Edwards-Edwards (1991), Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment Valdés (1995), Pinochet's Economists French-Davis (2010), Economic Reforms in Chile Notes Pre-1996 sample extension; framework codes content + institutional-quality dimensions separately per Invariant 3.
IESET — an empirically-grounded, adversarially-reviewed framework for contemporary economic policy questions. Every hypothesis pre-registered in git before the data is examined.