IESET.
Movements·portugal_montenegro_ad_2024_present

Montenegro AD minority government under Chega leverage (Portugal 2024-present)

PRT·2024present·AD (Aliança Democrática: PSD + CDS-PP + PPM) minority government with 80 of 230 Assembleia seats after 10 March 2024 election; dependent vote-by-vote on abstention or support from Chega (50 seats) or PS (78 seats)
Leaders: Luís Montenegro (PSD leader; Prime Minister from 2 April 2024) · Joaquim Miranda Sarmento (Finance Minister 2024-) · Nuno Melo (CDS-PP leader, Defence Minister) · Paulo Rangel (Foreign Affairs Minister) · Pedro Duarte (Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, chief negotiator with Chega/PS)
positionsordoliberalempirical_pragmatistsocial_democraticdemocratic_socialist

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Centre-right AD coalition installed after the 10 March 2024 snap election triggered by Costa's resignation. Economic school: centre- right AD liberalism (PSD liberal-conservative + CDS Christian- democratic + PPM) — lower-tax, supply-side, pro-investment, EU- mainstream — constrained by a fragmented Assembleia in which the Chega populist right (1.1% in 2019 → 7.2% in 2022 → 18.1% in 2024) holds 50 seats and sets the agenda by refusing systematic abstention. Left-right axis: centre-right executive operating under structural populist-right leverage; outcomes depend on whether any given bill is passed with Chega support (migration, security) or PS abstention (budget, EU files). Core content so far: (a) IRS reform continuation — OE2024 (inherited) kept IRS Jovem and Montenegro's OE2025 widened it (tax-free first year for under- 35s, progressive relief through age 35) and trimmed middle-bracket rates; (b) corporate IRC cut trajectory — statutory rate reduced from 21% toward 17% over multi-year path (contested by PS/Chega); (c) civil-service and security-forces pay rises to defuse PSP/GNR 2024 dispute; (d) housing — partial rollback of Mais Habitação (Lei 56/2023) coercive measures (forced-lease article, rent-cap tightening) via Construir Portugal package; retention of AL licence freeze; VAT on construction of affordable housing cut to 6%; (e) golden-visa regime — retained post-2023 scope (excluding real-estate track) with emphasis on scientific / investment-fund channels; (f) migration tightening under Chega pressure — manifestações de interesse regularisation channel ended June 2024, CPLP mobility agreement narrowed, Agência para a Integração, Migrações e Asilo (AIMA) backlog reform; (g) SNS capacity package and private-sector triage pilots; (h) EU posture — continued NextGenerationEU PRR execution with 2026 deadline pressure and active defence-spending scaling toward 2% NATO target. Popularity: AD coalition 28.8% in March 2024 (versus PS 28.0% — a 0.8-point win); Chega 18.1% the story of the cycle. European Parliament June 2024: AD 31.1% (first), PS 32.1% (second — a reversal), Chega 9.8% (under-performed vs national vote). 2025 autárquicas (local elections): PS retained Lisboa and Porto; AD strong in north and interior; Chega built first municipal footholds. Approval volatile — Montenegro net-positive at installation, eroded through 2025 on cost-of-living and immigration salience. Coherence judgement: programmatically coherent centre-right agenda executed under unprecedented parliamentary leverage from the populist right, making the movement's coding as much about what Chega allows through as what AD proposes.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

tax corporate
fiscal.tax_corporate
Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
decreased · moderate
lower corporate tax burden
IRC statutory rate reduction from 21% toward 17% multi-year path; SME surcharge reductions.
~
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
mixed
IRS Jovem expansion adds age-targeted progressivity at the bottom but middle-bracket rate cuts flatten the overall schedule — direction genuinely mixed.
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
Civil-service and security-forces pay rises plus defence scaling toward 2% NATO target; partially offset by PRR under-execution.
immigration openness
regulatory.immigration_openness
Immigration policy openness — work visas, family reunification, asylum processing, border enforcement posture.
decreased · moderate
more restrictive (lower caps, tighter enforcement)
End of manifestações de interesse regularisation channel (June 2024), tightened CPLP-mobility scope, AIMA throughput reforms under Chega pressure.
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
increased · weak
more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)
Partial rollback of Agenda do Trabalho Digno provisions proposed; enacted scope modest under minority constraints.
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
decreased · weak
looser licensing, more open entry
Construir Portugal removed forced-lease article and loosened rent-cap formula for new leases; net easing of housing-sector licensing constraints relative to Costa-era package.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
unchanged · weak
No headline PMR programme enacted; minority constraints limit scope.
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
unchanged · weak
Institutional norms intact; Chega parliamentary conduct tested rules-of-procedure but no structural erosion.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
ordoliberal
EU fiscal-rule compliance posture plus supply-side tax content.
partial
empirical_pragmatist
Minority-government bargaining forces empirical case-by-case policy assembly.

References

Notes

Movement coded as active from 2 April 2024 (Montenegro investidura). Distinctive feature for IESET purposes: the movement's effective policy space is bounded by Chega's parliamentary leverage, making this a canonical case of centre-right doctrine operating under a populist-right agenda-setting constraint — relevant to hypotheses on minority-government policy drift and populist-right leverage effects on incumbent-right programmes.