Movements·south_sudan_r_arcss_transitional_government_2018_present

South Sudan R-ARCSS transitional unity government

SSD·2018 – present·Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity

Leaders: Salva Kiir Mayardit (President) · Riek Machar (First Vice President) · R-ARCSS signatory parties and transitional institutions

Doctrine — stated goals and content

South Sudan's R-ARCSS transitional regime is built around ending civil war through power sharing, security arrangements, constitutional drafting, public-finance stabilization, and eventual elections. In practice the governing coalition has repeatedly extended the transition while using donor and IMF engagement to improve public-finance controls in an oil-dependent state.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

mixed · moderate

The peace agreement and PFM reforms created formal transition controls, while the security law and election postponement weakened due process and electoral accountability.

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

mixed · weak

Peace implementation raised spending needs, while IMF-backed cash-management reforms constrained arrears and discretionary spending.

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central bank independence

monetary.central_bank_independence

De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.

increased · weak

greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)

PFM and cash-management reforms aimed to reduce fiscal dominance over monetary policy.

judicial independence

institutional.judicial_independence

Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.

mixed · weak

Transitional justice commitments pointed toward stronger legal institutions, but security-service powers and repeated extensions weakened checks.

Policies enacted

· ssd_r_arcss_peace_agreement_2018
· ssd_imf_smp_pfm_oil_revenue_reforms_2023
· ssd_national_security_service_act_2024
· ssd_transition_extension_elections_2024

References

R-ARCSS agreement text, IGAD/RJMEC monitoring, and UNMISS implementation reporting.
IMF and World Bank South Sudan public-finance and oil-revenue reform reporting, 2023-2025.
UN, Associated Press, Reuters, and rights-organization reporting on the 2024 National Security Service law and election postponement.

Notes

The movement is a fragile transition coding. Implementation capacity, security-sector integration, and oil-revenue transparency remain major caveats.