IESET.
Movements·uk_sunak_conservative_2022_2024

Sunak Conservative government (UK)

GBR·2022 – 2024·Conservative majority (inherited from 2019 Johnson mandate; no fresh electoral mandate)
Leaders: Rishi Sunak (PM, October 2022 – July 2024) · Jeremy Hunt (Chancellor, October 2022 – July 2024)
positionsempirical_pragmatistaustrian

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Drew from orthodox fiscal-conservative Treasury-brain doctrine fused with a supply-side National Insurance-cut agenda, acting as a credibility restoration project after the Truss mini-budget shock. Positioned on the centre-right — fiscally orthodox (OBR-respecting), monetarily conventional, socially conservative, with a harder line on immigration and legal-activism than Johnson. Key measures: Autumn Statement 17 November 2022 (windfall Energy Profits Levy extended and raised to 35%, personal allowance and thresholds frozen producing fiscal drag); Spring Budget 15 March 2023 confirming corporation tax rise to 25% from April 2023 and full expensing of plant-and-machinery; two cuts to employee National Insurance (12% → 10% January 2024; 10% → 8% April 2024); Illegal Migration Act 2023 and Safety of Rwanda Act 2024; Online Safety Act 2023; mortgage-interest relief period during Bank Rate rise cycle; Windsor Framework February 2023 settling Northern Ireland Protocol. Entered via intra-party leadership (no popular vote); Conservatives polled 23-28% through 2023-24 and lost the July 2024 general election with 23.7% vote share — worst Conservative result in modern era. Programme cohered internally as an orthodoxy-plus-tax-cut package but was politically stranded by inherited cost-of-living damage and coalition fatigue.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
increased · moderate
more progressive (higher top rates, wider spread, larger targeted credits)
Frozen thresholds produced significant fiscal drag; offsetting NI cuts fell on employees, not pensioners/landlords.
↑
tax corporate
fiscal.tax_corporate
Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
increased · strong
higher corporate tax burden
19% → 25% main rate from April 2023; largest corporate tax rise in a generation.
↓
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
decreased · weak
lower spending share
Energy Price Guarantee tapered; real-terms departmental settlements tight post-2024/25.
↓
immigration openness
regulatory.immigration_openness
Immigration policy openness — work visas, family reunification, asylum processing, border enforcement posture.
decreased · moderate
more restrictive (lower caps, tighter enforcement)
Rwanda scheme, raised salary threshold for skilled worker visas (April 2024), student dependant curbs.
—
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
unchanged
Maintained BoE independence and inflation-target regime; explicit restoration of OBR role post-Truss.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
empirical_pragmatist
partial
austrian

References