Late-LDP crisis-management doctrine — two transitional cabinets (Fukuda, Asō) governing a twisted Diet (LDP-Komeito lost Upper House July 2007, DPJ control) and a collapsing global economy. Fukuda pursued a consensual centre-right line (G8 Hokkaidō-Tōyako summit July 2008 emphasised climate and food prices) but resigned September 2008 citing inability to govern the split Diet. Asō took over weeks before Lehman and became Japan's GFC-response PM: three supplementary budgets totalling ~¥26tn fiscal stimulus, ¥12,000 per resident cash handout (teigakukyūfukin, announced November 2008, distributed 2009), eco-car and eco-point subsidies for white goods and vehicles, and major SME credit-guarantee expansion via JFC/Shōkō-Chūkin. BoJ cut policy rate from 0.50% to 0.30% (October 2008) then 0.10% (December 2008), restarted JGB/commercial-paper outright purchases. Exports collapsed 40%+ peak-to-trough, 2009 GDP contracted ~5.4%. Popularity of both cabinets bled out; LDP lost the August 2009 Shūgiin election by landslide (DPJ 308 seats vs LDP 119), ending 54 years of near-continuous LDP rule. Coherence line: reactive Keynesian stimulus grafted onto tired LDP coalition, outvoted by DPJ regime-change wave.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
¥12,000 per resident cash handout; SME credit guarantees expanded dramatically.
Shirakawa memoirs, Bank of Japan rate-cut record Oct-Dec 2008
MIC 2009 general election results (30 Aug 2009)
Notes
Two PMs combined into one movement because Fukuda's 11-month cabinet and Asō's 12-month cabinet share the same twisted-Diet constraint and the same late-LDP GFC response posture; doctrinally continuous.