DPJ Kan doctrinal pivot — from Hatoyama's debt-funded transfer expansion toward a consumption-tax-funded fiscal-consolidation line ("strong economy, strong finances, strong social security"). Kan floated a 10% consumption-tax hike pledge days before the July 2010 Upper House election — DPJ lost badly, restoring twisted-Diet dynamics. Programme recovered around three vectors: (1) New Growth Strategy (June 2010) naming green innovation, health, and Asia as priority sectors; (2) TPP interest declaration (October 2010) — formal DPJ reversal on trade liberalisation; (3) post-11 March 2011 crisis response to the magnitude-9.0 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns — evacuation of 160,000+ residents, SPEEDI dissemination controversy, first supplementary budget FY2011 ¥4tn (May 2011) and second supplementary ¥2tn (July 2011) for reconstruction. Kan announced Japan would review its nuclear programme, forced Hamaoka plant shutdown (May 2011), and pushed a feed-in tariff (FIT) law for renewables (enacted August 2011). Coherence line: DPJ Kan consumption-tax orthodoxy plus green restart plus Fukushima crisis management. Popularity ended ~18%; Kan resigned September 2011 after securing FIT passage and second supplementary budget.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
TPP pivot welcomed; nuclear retreat and FIT tariff less so.
References
Act on Special Measures concerning Procurement of Renewable Energy (FIT law), Law No. 108 of 2011
Cabinet Office — FY2011 supplementary budgets 1 and 2
Government Accident Investigation Committee on Fukushima Daiichi, interim report Dec 2011
Notes
Kan's doctrinal contribution is separable from Hatoyama's because the consumption-tax-finance pivot, the FIT/anti-nuclear turn, and TPP interest are all distinctly Kan-cabinet moves. Fukushima crisis management is the defining external shock.