IESET.
Movements·japan_kan_dpj_2010_2011

Kan DPJ — Tōhoku/Fukushima crisis cabinet

JPN·20102011·DPJ-PNP coalition (Kan Naoto cabinet)
Leaders: Naoto Kan (PM, 8 Jun 2010 - 2 Sep 2011) · Yoshihiko Noda (Finance) · Yukio Edano (Chief Cabinet Secretary during Fukushima) · Masaaki Shirakawa (BoJ Governor)
positionsnew_keynesianclassical_liberal

Doctrine — stated goals and content

DPJ Kan doctrinal pivot — from Hatoyama's debt-funded transfer expansion toward a consumption-tax-funded fiscal-consolidation line ("strong economy, strong finances, strong social security"). Kan floated a 10% consumption-tax hike pledge days before the July 2010 Upper House election — DPJ lost badly, restoring twisted-Diet dynamics. Programme recovered around three vectors: (1) New Growth Strategy (June 2010) naming green innovation, health, and Asia as priority sectors; (2) TPP interest declaration (October 2010) — formal DPJ reversal on trade liberalisation; (3) post-11 March 2011 crisis response to the magnitude-9.0 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns — evacuation of 160,000+ residents, SPEEDI dissemination controversy, first supplementary budget FY2011 ¥4tn (May 2011) and second supplementary ¥2tn (July 2011) for reconstruction. Kan announced Japan would review its nuclear programme, forced Hamaoka plant shutdown (May 2011), and pushed a feed-in tariff (FIT) law for renewables (enacted August 2011). Coherence line: DPJ Kan consumption-tax orthodoxy plus green restart plus Fukushima crisis management. Popularity ended ~18%; Kan resigned September 2011 after securing FIT passage and second supplementary budget.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

environmental stringency
regulatory.environmental_stringency
Environmental regulation stringency — emissions caps, standards, phase-out mandates, carbon pricing, renewable portfolio standards.
increased · strong
more stringent environmental rules
FIT law for renewables enacted August 2011; forced Hamaoka shutdown.
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
decreased · strong
lower supply-security posture (single-supplier dependence, early phase-outs)
Post-Fukushima rolling nuclear shutdowns; 54 reactors → <5 operational within a year.
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · moderate
higher spending share
Reconstruction supplementary budgets plus structural deficit continuing.
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · weak
more open trade
TPP interest declaration October 2010 reversed prior DPJ stance; negotiation entry still years away.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
new_keynesian
Reconstruction deficit spending in slack economy.
partial
classical_liberal
TPP pivot welcomed; nuclear retreat and FIT tariff less so.

References

Notes

Kan's doctrinal contribution is separable from Hatoyama's because the consumption-tax-finance pivot, the FIT/anti-nuclear turn, and TPP interest are all distinctly Kan-cabinet moves. Fukushima crisis management is the defining external shock.