IESET.
Movements·peru_boluarte_post_castillo_2022_present

Boluarte post-Castillo government (Peru)

PER·2022 – present·Nominally independent (Boluarte expelled from Perú Libre in Jan 2022) governing on de-facto alliance with congressional right/centre-right blocs — Fuerza Popular, Alianza para el Progreso, Renovación Popular, Avanza País, Acción Popular — without a disciplined party whip.
Leaders: Dina Boluarte (President 2022-present) · Alex Contreras (Economy Minister 2022-2023) · José Arista (Economy Minister 2024) · José Salardi (Economy Minister 2024-present) · Óscar Becerra / Rómulo Mucho / Jorge Montero (rotating Energy & Mines) · Víctor Torres / Juan José Santiváñez (Interior Ministers during protest crackdown)
positionsclassical_liberalinstitutionalism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Continuity centrist macro-orthodoxy under de-facto congressional right-wing backing after Castillo's failed self-coup attempt (Dec 7 2022) and immediate impeachment. Economic doctrine is "muddling-through" pragmatism: preserve the 1993-Constitution macro framework (BCRP independence, fiscal rules, open capital account), facilitate large-scale mining and gas investment (Quellaveco ramp-up, Tía María restart, Michiquillay permitting, Camisea contract renegotiation), and avoid heterodox experiments. Parallel strands: (i) law-and-order posture justifying Dec 2022-Jan 2023 police and military deployment against southern-highlands protests that left ~49 civilians dead per IACHR and OHCHR tallies (Ayacucho, Apurímac, Puno, Junín) plus ~12 further deaths across 2023; (ii) serial Congress-driven populist pension withdrawals (seventh and eighth AFP retiro laws 2023-2024) eroding the private pension pillar; (iii) institutional-quality erosion via the Ley APCI (2024) restricting NGO cooperation and litigation, repeated weakening of the Junta Nacional de Justicia and prosecutorial independence, and assaults on the Fiscalía de la Nación investigating the Rolex / luxury-goods case against Boluarte herself; (iv) persistent executive-congressional collusion to roll back organized-crime and environmental-crime enforcement. Approval collapsed below 5% (IEP, Ipsos 2024) — historically unprecedented — yet the coalition persists because Congress and executive share an interest in avoiding early elections. The IESET coding separates pro-investment market-content moves from sharp rule-of-law and judicial-independence deterioration per Invariant 3.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · weak
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Mining and hydrocarbons permitting facilitation; extractive-sector investment promotion.
↓
environmental stringency
regulatory.environmental_stringency
Environmental regulation stringency — emissions caps, standards, phase-out mandates, carbon pricing, renewable portfolio standards.
decreased · weak
less stringent environmental rules
Rollback of environmental crime enforcement; weakening of forestry and prior-consultation checks.
↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · weak
larger transfer footprint
Congress-driven AFP pension withdrawals act as one-off consumption transfers, eroding forced-saving pillar.
—
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
unchanged · weak
BCRP autonomy preserved; Julio Velarde continued; no politicisation of monetary policy.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Lethal force against protesters with minimal prosecutorial accountability; Ley APCI restricts civil-society oversight; repeated interference with Fiscalía and JNJ.
↓
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · strong
weaker judicial independence
Congress removed JNJ members; pressure on Attorney General investigating executive; Constitutional Tribunal reshuffles.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
institutional_erosion_market_access_divergence

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
classical_liberal
Market-content continuity but rule-of-law degradation flagged as opposed.
opposed
institutionalism

References

Notes

Approval under 5% (Ipsos, IEP 2024-2025) is historically unprecedented in the polled era for any sitting Peruvian president. Coalition survival explained by shared executive-congressional interest in completing the 2021-2026 term rather than triggering early elections. Framework codes pro-investment market content and rule-of-law erosion as separate dimensions.