IESET.
Movements·peru_garcia_apra_second_2006_2011

García APRA II — heterodox-turned-orthodox, 'dog in the manger', Bagua

PER·20062011·APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana)
Leaders: Alan García Pérez (President 2006-2011; second term) · Luis Carranza / Luis Valdivieso / Mercedes Aráoz (MEF) · Julio Velarde (BCRP 2006-) · Yehude Simon / Javier Velásquez Quesquén (PCM)
positionsclassical_liberalempirical_pragmatist

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Ideological reversal from 1985-1990 heterodox-catastrophe first term to orthodox pro-investment second term, colliding with indigenous- rights conflicts. Five doctrinal pillars: (a) Orthodoxy reversal — García's first term (1985-90) had ended in hyperinflation 7,500%; second term maintained inflation targeting (Velarde BCRP), fiscal rule, US-Peru FTA implementation (in force Feb 2009); GDP growth averaged 6.8% 2006-2011 with peak 9.1% (2008). (b) "El perro del hortelano" ("dog in the manger") Op-Ed 28 October 2007 in El Comercio — argued Amazonian indigenous lands should be opened to private investment; sparked 18-24 months of tension. (c) Bagua massacre 5 June 2009 (Baguazo) — conflict at Curva del Diablo over Legislative Decrees 1015/1073/1090 opening Amazonian concessions; 33 deaths (including 23 police); decrees repealed; CGTP general strike; ILO Convention 169 consultation framework forced (Ley de Consulta Previa 2011). (d) Financial-crisis response — 2009 stimulus package; reserves-buffered exchange rate intervention; banking-sector remained sound. (e) Corruption shadow + post-presidency — Petroaudios scandal 2008 (narcoindultos prosecution later); Odebrecht case (2017+) eventually led to García's suicide 17 Apr 2019 when arrest imminent. Stated school: pragmatic orthodox-APRA (renounced 1985-90 heterodoxy); social-liberal rhetoric. Left-right: centre; APRA historically centre-left but García II operated centre-right. Popularity: 4 June 2006 runoff García 52.6% vs Humala 47.4%; approval >60% early, fell to ~20-30% post-Baguazo; 5 June 2011 runoff Humala (Gana Perú) 51.4% vs Keiko Fujimori 48.5%. Coherence: trade APRA heterodox identity and Amazonian concession opening for FTA implementation, 9.1% growth peak, and investment-grade rating (Fitch April 2008, S&P July 2008) — at direct cost of Baguazo conflict and downstream Odebrecht exposure.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · strong
more open trade
US FTA came into force Feb 2009; China FTA signed 2009.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · moderate
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Extractive-concessions opening attempted (partially reversed post-Baguazo).
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · moderate
weaker rule of law
Baguazo conflict; legislative-decree abuse; later Odebrecht revelations.
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
2009 stimulus; pro-investment tax incentives.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
extractive_concession_conflict_tradeoff
not yet written
apra_ideological_reversal_credibility

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

References

Notes

Distinct from García's catastrophic first term (1985-1990); contrast used as ieset ideological-reversal exemplar.