Wickremesinghe UNP transitional — IMF crisis executor (Sri Lanka)

Doctrine — stated goals and content

UNP technocratic IMF-bailout executor appointed by Parliament in the aftermath of the July 2022 Aragalaya to manage the crisis without an electoral mandate of his own. Core policy content: (i) IMF Extended Fund Facility $2.9bn / 48-month, Executive Board approval 20 Mar 2023, with 2.3% of GDP primary-surplus target by 2025; (ii) VAT hike 15%->18% effective 1 Jan 2024 plus VAT-threshold compression and reinstatement of PAYE — reversing the 2019 Gotabaya cuts; (iii) Central Bank of Sri Lanka Act No. 16 of 2023 codifying operational independence, flexible inflation targeting, and a statutory prohibition on monetary financing; (iv) SOE restructuring framework — CEB cost-recovery electricity tariffs (Aug 2022, Feb 2023, Jul 2023), CPC fuel pricing formula, SriLankan Airlines divestment track; (v) external-debt restructuring closer — Official Creditor Committee MoU Nov 2023 (Paris Club + India + China Exim via separate track), bondholder restructuring agreement-in-principle Jul 2024, exit from default Dec 2024 (technically completed under Dissanayake); (vi) Anti-Terrorism Bill (contested) and public- assembly restrictions against Aragalaya remnants. Coherence line: orthodox IMF-stabilisation + independent-CBSL architecture + distributional adjustment via VAT + SOE cost-recovery + debt restructuring completion — economically orthodox but politically delegitimised by appointment-without-mandate and heavy-handed policing. Popularity: parliamentary vote 134/223 on 20 Jul 2022; approval never broke 20% in Sep-Nov 2023 IHP polling; 2024 presidential race finish 17.3% third place — rejected at ballot box despite macro stabilisation.