IESET.
Movements·venezuela_maduro_era_distinct_2013_present

Maduro-era Venezuela (distinct from Chávez era)

VEN·2013 – present·PSUV + GPP (Gran Polo Patriótico); post-2020 ad hoc coalition with bolivariano security bloc
Leaders: Nicolás Maduro (President 2013-present) · Rafael Ramírez (PDVSA/oil, 2004-2014) · Tareck El Aissami (Vice President / Industry / Oil, various 2017-2023) · Delcy Rodríguez (Vice President 2018-present)
positionsmarxist_leninistaustrianchicago_monetarism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Continuation of the Chavista project under drastically different macroeconomic conditions: the 2014-2016 oil-price crash removed the commodity rent base on which 1999-2013 redistribution and import- substitution depended, and the regime's response was monetary-fiscal fusion (BCV financing of PDVSA and the non-oil deficit), exchange-rate regime multiplication (CADIVI, SICAD, SIMADI, DICOM, DIPRO), and eventual hyperinflation 2017-2019 meeting the Cagan threshold (monthly inflation >= 50%). Distinct content from the Chávez era includes: the Petro cryptocurrency launch 2018 (effectively abandoned), three currency redenominations (bolívar fuerte 2008 preceded; bolívar soberano 2018; bolívar digital 2021), de facto partial dollarisation after 2019 as bolívar use collapsed, post-2019 relaxation of price and FX controls as a survival measure, oil-output collapse from ~2.4 mb/d in 2013 to ~0.4 mb/d 2020 (recovering partially by 2024), escalating US sanctions (SDN 2017 on officials, PDVSA designation 2019, secondary sanctions on tanker operators), and mass emigration of ~7-8 million people (>=25% of population) by 2024 per UNHCR/R4V platform estimates. 2024 election contested with opposition (María Corina Machado/Edmundo González) claiming victory against official CNE results; regime retained power. Outcome: cumulative real GDP decline of >70% from the 2013 peak, one of the largest non-wartime peacetime contractions in the modern record.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↓
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · strong
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
BCV direct financing of PDVSA and fiscal deficit from 2013; reserve cover collapsed; multiple BCV presidents during 2013-2019.
↑
monetary expansion direction
monetary.monetary_expansion_direction
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
increased · strong
expansionary (balance sheet, rates lower than Taylor)
Cagan-threshold hyperinflation 2017-2019; base-money growth of orders of magnitude.
~
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
mixed · moderate
Continued price controls pre-2019; post-2019 de facto relaxation as shortages forced acceptance of parallel markets.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
2017 Supreme Court dissolution of National Assembly prerogatives; 2019 parallel government episode; 2024 election dispute.
↓
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · strong
weaker property rights
Post-2013 expropriation wave continued; post-2019 informal property-rights erosion as state capacity collapsed.
↓
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
decreased · strong
more protectionist
FX rationing functioned as import restriction; sanctions regime from 2017 further restricted trade access.
~
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
mixed · moderate
Nominal spending surged via monetisation; real spending on public goods collapsed as the tax base and oil rents both evaporated.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

inconclusive
maduro_era_venezuelan_collapse_decomposition_2013_2023
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'maduro_era_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
inconclusive
hyperinflation_requires_fiscal_dominance
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['hanke:hyperinflation_table']
inconclusive
venezuela_chavismo_framework_validation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'venezuela_post_chavismo' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
marxist_leninist
Self-described heir to the Bolivarian project; actual policy became more survival-oriented than ideologically coherent after 2017.
opposed
austrian
opposed
chicago_monetarism

References

Notes

The split from venezuela_chavismo_bolivarian_1999_present is deliberate: that movement codes the 1999-2013 Chávez era (plus an umbrella label extending to the present for legacy continuity), while this movement carries the distinct Maduro-era content (2013 onwards). The maduro_era_venezuelan_collapse_decomposition_2013_2023 hypothesis attempts to attribute share of the collapse to (a) oil-price shock, (b) monetary-fiscal fusion, (c) sanctions, (d) political destabilisation.