Policies·ca_capital_gains_inclusion_cancellation_2025

Canada — Cancellation of 2024 capital-gains inclusion rate increase (2025)

CAN·2025 – present·enacted 2025-03-21·Liberal Party minority (pre-election caretaker)candidate

What the policy did

Budget 2024 (Trudeau/Freeland, April 2024) had announced an increase in the capital-gains inclusion rate from 50% to 66.67% for individuals on capital gains above C$250,000 per year and on all corporate and trust capital gains, effective 25 June 2024. The measure was administered via CRA notice but never passed as stand-alone legislation before Parliament was prorogued in January 2025. On 31 January 2025 the Finance Minister announced deferral of the effective date to 1 January 2026. Following the March 2025 leadership transition, the Carney government announced on 21 March 2025 that the proposed inclusion-rate increase would not proceed and directed CRA to administer on the 50% basis. Legislative cancellation incorporated into Budget 2025. Effect is to preserve the 50% inclusion rate that had applied since 2000. Lifetime capital-gains exemption increase and Canadian Entrepreneurs' Incentive remained under review.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

tax capital

fiscal.tax_capital

Taxation of capital income (dividends, capital gains, inheritance, wealth). Distinct from corporate rate.

decreased · moderate

lower capital income tax

Preserves the 50% capital-gains inclusion rate rather than moving to 66.67%, a meaningful reduction in the forward-looking effective tax rate on capital gains above the individual threshold and on all corporate gains.

unintended / side-effect

↓

tax progressivity

fiscal.tax_progressivity

Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).

decreased · weak · unintended

less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)

Foregone progressive measure — the cancelled increase would have been borne disproportionately by high-income and corporate filers; cancellation makes the forward-looking tax mix slightly less progressive.

Enacted by

canada_carney_liberal_2025_present

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Wealth taxes produce a three-order causal chain.

wealth_tax_capital_flight_revenue_yield_gapinferred

viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — FRA not in panel

run pending

Post-apartheid South African tax structure (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent in 2017, capital-gains inclusion ratio raised 2012 + 2016, recurring property-tax effective burden via municipal rates) produced a measurable reduction in the South African top-1 pretax income share over 1995-2024 vs SADC synthetic comparator pool, with the recurring property-tax channel contributing more than the marginal-income-rate channel to the distributional effect.

tax_inequality_south_africa_property_tax_burdeninferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=5, donors=0)

run pending

Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.

tax_inequality_chile_post_pinochet_progressivityinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=0, donors=0)

run pending

Macron's 2017 reform replacing the French ISF (Impot de Solidarite sur la Fortune) with the IFI (real-estate-only wealth tax) and the introduction of the 30 percent flat tax (PFU) on capital income produced a measurable rise in the French top-1 pre-tax income share over 2018-2022 relative to Eurozone synthetic control, but a smaller-than-projected fall in HNW emigration once concurrent CRS enforcement is accounted for.

tax_inequality_france_2017_isf_to_ifi_abolitioninferred

viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+1.331, |gap|/pre_sd=2.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86) — which paired a top-rate cut from 50 to 28 percent with substantial base-broadening (passive-loss limits, AMT expansion, capital-gains rate harmonisation) — produced a smaller persistent top-1 income share response than ERTA 1981 once the one-off 1986-1988 realisation spike from capital-gains reclassification is removed.

tax_inequality_reagan_1986_base_broadening_neutralityinferred

viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity

REFUTED — shape=ITS, sign + OPPOSITE claim -, mean_gap=+1.194, z=+3.4

refuted

Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.

universal_transfer_programmes_labour_force_participation_declineinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital

partial — Prime-age LFP fell by ≥1.0pp in 2/5 cases (threshold for SUPPORTED: ≥3). First-order improved in 3/4 cases. Mixed: consistent with the spec's design-d…

partial

Piketty's r > g dynamic post-1980 produced wealth-to-income ratios reaching or exceeding pre-1914 levels in major OECD economies, consistent with social-democratic claims about structural inequality drift absent policy intervention.

r_minus_g_wealth_income_ratio_post_1980inferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'realised_r_minus_g_gap' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Norway's continued retention of an annual wealth tax (formuesskatt) through 2024 — at rates of 0.85-1.1 percent on net wealth above NOK 1.7M — is associated with a top-1 wealth share trajectory that lies below the Nordic-ex-Norway synthetic counterfactual by at least 1 percentage point over 2010-2024, without a large register-based HNW emigration response prior to the 2022 rate increase.

tax_inequality_norway_wealth_tax_retentioninferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+2.245, |gap|/pre_sd=3.7, p_perm=1; claim direction ambiguous

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Bush 43 tax cuts (EGTRRA 2001 + JGTRRA 2003)

USA·2001

match

1.5

tax progressivitytax capital

Foermoegenhetsskatt (wealth tax) abolition 2007

SWE·2007

match

1.4

tax capitaltax progressivity

Swedish 'Tax Reform of the Century' 1990-1991

SWE·1990