De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
From late 1997 the Banque du Liban formally pegged the Lebanese pound to the US dollar at approximately LBP 1,507.5/USD within a narrow band, anchoring inflation and supporting confidence in the post-civil-war banking system. Maintaining the peg required permanent absorption of dollar inflows through high-yield local-currency Treasury bills and, from the mid-2010s, increasingly exotic BDL operations — a regime that broke under the 2019 liquidity crisis.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.