De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Lebanon's sovereign-debt accumulation between 1992 and 2019 reflected successive governments' financing of Hariri-era reconstruction and large public-sector wage bills with high-coupon LBP-denominated treasury bills sold to commercial banks at heavily positive real rates, anchored by Banque du Liban's de-facto USD peg. By 2019 public debt exceeded 150% of GDP. The 'financial engineering' operations of 2016 onwards rolled deposits into BdL at unsustainable spreads. The intended effect was political-coalition stability through patronage and the peg; the system collapsed in 2019.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.