De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Parliamentary fiscal rule tying government-deficit financing to the expected real return on the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG /SPU). Initially set at 4% (later revised to 3% in 2017 reflecting lower return expectations). Created long-run commitment device preserving GPFG real capital and preventing fiscal accommodation of petroleum-revenue volatility. Refinements D.2.9 + D.2.10 repeatedly cite this as the institutional mechanism distinguishing Norway from other resource-rich economies — both within the Nordic cluster and globally against PDVSA / YPF counterexamples.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.