IESET.
Policies·png_mining_act_1992

Papua New Guinea Mining Act 1992

PNG·1992 presentcandidate
movessectoral licensingproperty rights~

What the policy did

Papua New Guinea's Mining Act 1992 modernised mining licensing and state authority over mineral development after the first post-independence resource cycle. The framework structured exploration licences, mining leases, and state-landowner-company negotiations for major projects.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · strong
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
Mining entry and development depend on formal licences and state approvals.
~
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
mixed · moderate
The act formalised mining rights while interacting with customary landowner claims.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING
run pending
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing
PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).
zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.
decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivityinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_inp…
run pending
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produced a sustained acceleration in per-capita GDP growth.
india_1991_liberalisation_growth_accelerationinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing
SUPPORTED — post-1991 annualised log-growth +4.67%/yr vs pre-1991 +1.96%/yr; acceleration +2.70pp/yr (threshold +2.00pp/yr).
supported
China's agricultural output growth accelerated after the household responsibility system replaced collective farming, relative to comparable middle-income reform peers.
household_responsibility_system_china_agricultural_surgeinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing
PARTIAL — coef=+1.809, p=0.369 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References