Modernising-neoliberal return of the PRI under a technocratic-reformist leadership team that used the cross-party Pacto por México (signed 2 December 2012 with PAN and PRD) to push through the largest bundle of structural reforms since the Salinas era. Economic school: Mexican market-liberal with institutionalist framing — open Pemex to private upstream capital, force competition in telecoms, formalise an evaluation-based teaching career, broaden the tax base. Sits clearly centre-right on the economic axis; pairs liberalisation with an active legalistic-institutionalist build-out of new regulators (IFT, CNH, CRE with expanded mandate, SAT modernisation). Signature policies include: (i) energy reform Dec 2013 (constitutional Arts. 25, 27, 28) ending Pemex's 75-year upstream monopoly and creating farm-out / licensing rounds, with secondary laws Aug 2014; (ii) telecoms reform Jun 2013 creating the IFT as constitutional regulator and forcing asymmetric obligations on "preponderant" players (América Móvil / Televisa); (iii) education reform Feb 2013 creating INEE teacher evaluation and service law; (iv) fiscal / hacendaria reform Oct 2013 (effective 2014) eliminating IETU/IDE, capping deductions, raising top PIT to 35%, introducing junk-food/sugary-drink excises and homologating VAT at the border; (v) financial reform 2014; (vi) political-electoral reform 2014 (INE replacing IFE, re-election of legislators). Popularity trajectory: won July 2012 with 38.2% plurality, PRI+PVEM held ~251 Cámara seats (lower house majority via alliance); approval peaked mid-2013 around ~50%, collapsed to 12-25% after Ayotzinapa (Sep 2014), Casa Blanca (Nov 2014) and 2017 gasolinazo; ended 2018 among the least popular presidents on record, with the PRI reduced to third place and 14% of the vote that year. Coherence line: reformist content was materially liberalising on regulated sectors (energy, telecoms, labour-adjacent education) and pro-competition in product markets; the movement's legitimacy was hollowed by corruption scandals and security failures, producing the backlash that carried AMLO to power in 2018.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
Constitutional amendment permits licensing, production-sharing and profit-sharing contracts for hydrocarbons; farm-outs and Rondas 1-3 executed 2015-2018.
more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)
Ley Federal del Trabajo reform (Nov 2012, inherited from Calderón but enacted during PN transition) introduced hourly contracts, outsourcing rules, reduced firing costs.
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
increased · weak
stronger judicial independence
Adversarial criminal-procedure transition completed 2016 nationally; counterbalanced by executive capture allegations in specific cases.
Policies enacted
· mx_energy_reform_2013
· mx_telecoms_reform_2013
· mx_education_reform_2013
· mx_fiscal_reform_2014
· mx_financial_reform_2014
· mx_political_electoral_reform_2014
What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses
The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.
refuted — GBR TFP growth FELL post-1984 (-0.51pp/yr, pre +0.97% → post +0.46%) AND underperformed the comparator-OECD mean (-0.55pp/yr; comparator post +1.01%). The productivity-from-privatisation premise does not show in PWT country-level TFP.
Pacto por México is analytically important: the reforms required PRI + PAN + PRD negotiation because constitutional change needs 2/3 majority. The cross-party pact explains why the content is coherently market- liberal despite the PRI label — PAN (centre-right) provided content alignment, PRD (centre-left) extracted the political-electoral reform in exchange. Invariant 3 applies: content, not party label.