MEX·1988 – 1994·PRI under Carlos Salinas de Gortari with US-trained technocrat economic team
Leaders: Carlos Salinas de Gortari (President 1988-1994) · Pedro Aspe (Finance Minister 1988-1994) · Jaime Serra Puche (Commerce, NAFTA negotiator) · Miguel Mancera (Banco de México Governor) · José Córdoba Montoya (Chief of Staff)
Accelerated continuation of the market-liberalisation turn begun under de la Madrid (1982-1988), executed with technocratic concentration under Salinas. Major strands: (1) large privatisation programme — Telmex (1990), 18 commercial banks (1991-1992), Mexicana and Aeroméxico, steel and fertiliser SOEs, raising ~$23bn; (2) constitutional reform of Article 27 (1992) ending ejido inalienability and permitting transfer / private investment in communal lands; (3) NAFTA negotiation 1990-1992, signature December 1992, entry into force 1 January 1994; (4) Banco de México autonomy granted via constitutional reform in April 1994 with price- stability mandate; (5) Pacto de Solidaridad Económica — tripartite incomes/exchange-rate pact from 1987 binding wages, prices and a managed exchange-rate crawl; (6) Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (Pronasol) as discretionary social-spending vehicle. The regime's external anchor — a managed, appreciating peso — proved fragile to the 1994 political shocks (Chiapas uprising Jan 1994, Colosio assassination Mar 1994, Ruiz Massieu Sep 1994) and to tesobonos dollar-indexed debt exposure; the Dec 1994 devaluation triggered the Tequila Crisis. Stated case: transform Mexico into a North American manufacturing platform with locked-in liberalisation commitments; canonical case of structural reform paired with exchange-rate rigidity that could not absorb shocks.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
refuted — GBR TFP growth FELL post-1984 (-0.51pp/yr, pre +0.97% → post +0.46%) AND underperformed the comparator-OECD mean (-0.55pp/yr; comparator post +1.01%). The productivity-from-privatisation premise does not show in PWT country-level TFP.