Policies·br_pre_sal_partition_production_regime_2010

Pre-salt partition-of-production regulatory regime

BRA·2010 – ·enacted 2010-12-22·PT + PMDBcandidate

movesproperty rights↓sectoral licensing↑

What the policy did

Lei 12.351/2010 (22 Dec 2010) established partição de produção regime for pre-salt fields — Petrobras designated sole operator with minimum 30% equity, PPSA as federal partner, production-sharing award of remaining share by bid. Lei 12.276/2010 cessão onerosa transferred 5bn boe to Petrobras for USD 42.5bn enabling 2010 follow-on offering. Regime amended by Lei 13.365/2016 removing Petrobras sole-operator requirement under Temer.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

property rights

institutional.property_rights

Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.

decreased · moderate

weaker property rights

Shift from concession to partition reduced contractor titular rights to reserves.

↑

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

increased · moderate

tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating

PPSA + ANP dual licensing layer added complexity.

Enacted by

brazil_lula_ii_pt_2007_2011

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.

zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.

land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).

zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.

decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivityinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_inp…

run pending

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produced a sustained acceleration in per-capita GDP growth.

india_1991_liberalisation_growth_accelerationinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

SUPPORTED — post-1991 annualised log-growth +4.67%/yr vs pre-1991 +1.96%/yr; acceleration +2.70pp/yr (threshold +2.00pp/yr).

supported

China's agricultural output growth accelerated after the household responsibility system replaced collective farming, relative to comparable middle-income reform peers.

household_responsibility_system_china_agricultural_surgeinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

PARTIAL — coef=+1.809, p=0.369 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Hydrocarbons nationalisation

DZA·1971

match

1.7

property rightssectoral licensing

Iraq Petroleum Company nationalisation 1972

IRQ·1972

match

1.7

property rightssectoral licensing

Enterprise Nationalisation Law and State Takeovers

MMR·1963