Policies·cz_eet_electronic_revenue_2016

Czech EET electronic revenue registration 2016

CZE·2016 – 2020·enacted 2016-12-01·CSSD-ANO-KDU-CSLcandidate

movessectoral licensing↓tax progressivity↑

What the policy did

Elektronicka evidence trzeb (EET), Babis-championed cash-transactions electronic point-of-sale reporting, rolled out in four waves from 1 Dec 2016 (hospitality/accommodation), 1 Mar 2017 (retail), with subsequent craft-trades wave delayed. Cash-transaction data transmitted in real time to Finance Ministry. Partially suspended in 2020 pandemic; abolished 2023.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

decreased · moderate

looser licensing, more open entry

POS-reporting obligation on all cash-accepting businesses.

↑

tax progressivity

fiscal.tax_progressivity

Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).

increased · weak

more progressive (higher top rates, wider spread, larger targeted credits)

Broadened tax base on previously under-reported cash economy.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.

tax_inequality_chile_post_pinochet_progressivityinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivity

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=0, donors=0)

run pending

Greek Memorandum-era tax hikes 2010-2018 (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent, VAT hikes to 24 percent standard, ENFIA recurring property tax 2014, solidarity surcharge 2011-2019) raised the disposable-income Gini coefficient by at least 1.5 Gini-points relative to Eurozone- comparator synthetic control over the period, with the regressivity driven by VAT and property-tax incidence rather than income-tax progressivity.

tax_inequality_greece_troika_tax_hikes_2010_2018inferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivity

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.175, |gap|/pre_sd=3.7, p_perm=0.333 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Post-apartheid South African tax structure (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent in 2017, capital-gains inclusion ratio raised 2012 + 2016, recurring property-tax effective burden via municipal rates) produced a measurable reduction in the South African top-1 pretax income share over 1995-2024 vs SADC synthetic comparator pool, with the recurring property-tax channel contributing more than the marginal-income-rate channel to the distributional effect.

tax_inequality_south_africa_property_tax_burdeninferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivity

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=5, donors=0)

run pending

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_tax_burden_account_ownership_current_gapinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityregulatory.sectoral_licensing

REFUTED — top-vs-bottom gap has opposite sign and Welch p=2.887e-05

refuted

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

heritage_tax_burden_account_ownership_income_region_robustnessinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityregulatory.sectoral_licensing

REFUTED — controlled market-score coefficient has opposite sign and p=0.01161

refuted

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

heritage_tax_burden_electricity_access_income_region_robustnessinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivityregulatory.sectoral_licensing

PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=1.457, p=0.1656)

partial

Progressive income-tax marginal rates (up to roughly 70% top rate) have been compatible with strong growth in post-war US 1945-1980 and Nordics, falsifying extreme-Laffer-curve positions.

top_marginal_rate_growth_tradeoffinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivity

PARTIAL — coef=+0.0006927, p=0.558 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_tax_burden_extreme_poverty_current_gapinferred

viafiscal.tax_progressivity

PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=1.296, p=0.7399)

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Netanyahu Emergency Economic Plan (Arrangements Law 2003)

ISR·2003

match

1.0

tax progressivitysectoral licensing

13Th 14Th Pension 2019 2022

POL·2017

match

1.0

tax progressivitysectoral licensing

Bank Asset Tax 2016

POL·2015