Policies·fi_basic_income_pilot_2017

Basic Income Pilot 2017

FIN·2015 – 2019candidate

movesspending level↓transfer expansion↓labour market flexibility↑tax corporate—

What the policy did

Finland's basic-income pilot, launched 1 January 2017 by the Sipilä centrist government under Act 1528/2016 and run by Kela, paid €560 per month tax-free to 2,000 randomly selected unemployed individuals aged 25-58 for two years, replacing existing means-tested benefits. The randomised design aimed to test labour-supply, well-being and bureaucratic-burden effects. The intended effect was to gather rigorous evidence on whether unconditional cash could improve activation and reduce administrative friction in the Nordic welfare model.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

decreased · weak

lower spending share

Pilot was a small-scale, time-limited substitution for existing benefits, with negligible aggregate spending change.

↓

transfer expansion

fiscal.transfer_expansion

Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.

decreased · weak

smaller transfer footprint

Pilot replaced rather than added to transfers; modest reduction in conditionality at the margin.

↑

labour market flexibility

regulatory.labour_market_flexibility

Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.

increased · weak

more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)

Removing benefit withdrawal cliffs lowered effective marginal taxes and frictions for participants.

—

tax corporate

fiscal.tax_corporate

Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.

unchanged · weak

No direct corporate-tax effect; included as null for movement-axis completeness.

Enacted by

finland_sipila_centrist_2015_2019

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Countries with stricter employment protection legislation — measured by the OECD EPL indicator (or comparable alternatives where OECD EPL is missing) — experience longer average unemployment duration, holding other controls constant.

labour_market_flexibility_unemployment_durationinferred

viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.transfer_expansion

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise …

run pending

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.

welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred

viafiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansionregulatory.labour_market_flexibility

PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Strong employment-protection legislation (EPL) with high union wage-setting coverage and limited at-will dismissal produces a three-order causal chain in Southern European labour markets.

strong_union_labour_law_youth_unemployment_south_europeinferred

viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.spending_level

PARTIAL — coef=+2.943, p=0.252 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.

universal_transfer_programmes_labour_force_participation_declineinferred

viafiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_level

partial — Prime-age LFP fell by ≥1.0pp in 2/5 cases (threshold for SUPPORTED: ≥3). First-order improved in 3/4 cases. Mixed: consistent with the spec's design-d…

partial

In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, greater labour-market flexibility — measured by lower OECD EPL overall strictness, higher ease-of-hiring scores, and absence of centralized wage bargaining — predicts higher employment-to- population ratios and faster real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, education, and trade openness.

labour_market_flexibility_employment_growth_panelinferred

viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility

PARTIAL — coef=-1.251, p=0.162 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Labour-market flexibility (ease of hiring and firing, low EPL, decentralised wage bargaining) improves long-run employment rates, productivity growth, and GDP per capita only when paired with complementary adjustment institutions: active labour-market policy (retraining, job search assistance), relocation support, or income-smoothing mechanisms (unemployment insurance, portable benefits).

labour_flexibility_security_complementinferred

viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.transfer_expansion

PARTIAL — coef=+1.306e-16, p=0.339; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

The labour-supply dis-employment elasticity of negative-income-tax (NIT) and earned-income-tax-credit (EITC) -style cash-transfer programmes is materially smaller than the canonical mid-1970s NIT- experiment headline estimates suggested.

friedman_negative_income_tax_labour_supply_smaller_than_predictedinferred

viafiscal.transfer_expansionregulatory.labour_market_flexibility

PARTIAL — ATT=+20.8, p=nan, N=53, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)

partial

Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.

labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility

PARTIAL — coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Milei Shock Therapy — Argentina December 2023 onward

ARG·2023

match

1.9

spending leveltransfer expansionlabour market flexibility

Greece Second Memorandum implementation under Samaras 2012-2014

GRC·2012

match

1.9

spending leveltransfer expansionlabour market flexibility

Belgium Global Plan 1993 (Plan Global / Globaal Plan)

BEL·1993