IESET.
Policies·fr_isf_ifi_2018

ISF → IFI — wealth tax narrowed to real-estate only

FRA·2018 ·enacted 2017-12-30·La République en Marche / MoDem presidential majoritycandidate
movestax capitaltax progressivity

What the policy did

Abolition of the Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune (ISF) on financial and business assets and its replacement by the Impôt sur la fortune immobilière (IFI), a real-estate-only wealth tax with the same €1.3m threshold and progressive 0.5-1.5% schedule. Intended to reduce capital flight and investment disincentives; critiqued as a distributionally regressive symbol ("président des riches").

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
tax capital
fiscal.tax_capital
Taxation of capital income (dividends, capital gains, inheritance, wealth). Distinct from corporate rate.
decreased · moderate
lower capital income tax
Financial and business wealth removed from the wealth-tax base.
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
decreased · moderate
less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)
Narrowing of wealth-tax base at the top.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Wealth taxes produce a three-order causal chain.
wealth_tax_capital_flight_revenue_yield_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — FRA not in panel
run pending
Post-apartheid South African tax structure (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent in 2017, capital-gains inclusion ratio raised 2012 + 2016, recurring property-tax effective burden via municipal rates) produced a measurable reduction in the South African top-1 pretax income share over 1995-2024 vs SADC synthetic comparator pool, with the recurring property-tax channel contributing more than the marginal-income-rate channel to the distributional effect.
tax_inequality_south_africa_property_tax_burdeninferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=5, donors=0)
run pending
Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.
tax_inequality_chile_post_pinochet_progressivityinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=0, donors=0)
run pending
Macron's 2017 reform replacing the French ISF (Impot de Solidarite sur la Fortune) with the IFI (real-estate-only wealth tax) and the introduction of the 30 percent flat tax (PFU) on capital income produced a measurable rise in the French top-1 pre-tax income share over 2018-2022 relative to Eurozone synthetic control, but a smaller-than-projected fall in HNW emigration once concurrent CRS enforcement is accounted for.
tax_inequality_france_2017_isf_to_ifi_abolitioninferred
viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+1.331, |gap|/pre_sd=2.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86) — which paired a top-rate cut from 50 to 28 percent with substantial base-broadening (passive-loss limits, AMT expansion, capital-gains rate harmonisation) — produced a smaller persistent top-1 income share response than ERTA 1981 once the one-off 1986-1988 realisation spike from capital-gains reclassification is removed.
tax_inequality_reagan_1986_base_broadening_neutralityinferred
viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivity
REFUTED — shape=ITS, sign + OPPOSITE claim -, mean_gap=+1.194, z=+3.4
refuted
Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.
universal_transfer_programmes_labour_force_participation_declineinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital
partial — Prime-age LFP fell by ≥1.0pp in 2/5 cases (threshold for SUPPORTED: ≥3). First-order improved in 3/4 cases. Mixed: consistent with the spec's design-d…
partial
Piketty's r > g dynamic post-1980 produced wealth-to-income ratios reaching or exceeding pre-1914 levels in major OECD economies, consistent with social-democratic claims about structural inequality drift absent policy intervention.
r_minus_g_wealth_income_ratio_post_1980inferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'realised_r_minus_g_gap' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Norway's continued retention of an annual wealth tax (formuesskatt) through 2024 — at rates of 0.85-1.1 percent on net wealth above NOK 1.7M — is associated with a top-1 wealth share trajectory that lies below the Nordic-ex-Norway synthetic counterfactual by at least 1 percentage point over 2010-2024, without a large register-based HNW emigration response prior to the 2022 rate increase.
tax_inequality_norway_wealth_tax_retentioninferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_capital
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+2.245, |gap|/pre_sd=3.7, p_perm=1; claim direction ambiguous
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.