Policies·be_three_stage_federalisation_1980_1993

Belgium three-stage federalisation (1980, 1988, 1993)

BEL·1980 – 1993·Martens coalitions (variable)candidate

What the policy did

Three constitutional-revision stages delivering Belgian federalisation: 1980 (communities with cultural/educational competences); 1988-89 (regional governments with economic/ employment competences); 1993 (Article 1 Constitution redefining Belgium as federal state, St Michael Accord creating Brussels region and Flemish/French community structures). Institutional transformation spanning Martens era and completed under Dehaene.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

increased · strong

stronger rule of law

Major constitutional settlement of linguistic-community cleavage.

↑

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

increased · weak

higher spending share

Additional governmental layers added coordination cost.

Enacted by

belgium_martens_cvp_1979_1992

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The v1 decomposition (three channels: WGI gov effectiveness, WGI rule of law, IMF debt/GDP) left 98% of the Nordic-vs-Southern-Europe log GDP/capita gap unexplained.

nordic_outcome_persistence_decomposition_v2inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawfiscal.spending_level

PARTIAL — coef=-0.1578, p=0.211 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.

welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.

unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …

supported

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).

latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_gdp_pc_growth_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.08348, p=0.913 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_high_tech_exports_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=+0.621, p=0.746 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_investment_share_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.3477, p=0.814 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Bolivia Ley de Participación Popular 1551 of 1994

BOL·1994

match

1.6

spending levelrule of law

Constituição Cidadã 1988 (Brazilian Constitution)

BRA·1988

match

1.6

rule of lawspending level

Indonesia Regional Autonomy 'Big Bang' (Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999)

IDN·1999