De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Lei Complementar 179/2021 granted the Banco Central do Brasil statutory operational autonomy with fixed-term mandates for the Governor and Directors (4 years, staggered and desynchronised from the presidential cycle). It codified the BCB's price-stability primary objective with secondary objectives of employment and financial stability, and removed the President's power to dismiss BCB leadership at will. The first test came under Lula III (2023-2024) when incoming executive preferences for lower rates did not produce statutory change.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.