Policies·br_imf_eff_1983

Brazil IMF Extended Fund Facility (1983)

BRA·1983 – 1985·enacted 1983-02-28candidate

movesspending level↓monetary expansion direction↓

What the policy did

SDR 4.239bn three-year EFF approved 28 February 1983 conditioned on fiscal retrenchment, public-enterprise adjustment, and trade-regime liberalisation; supplemented by CCFF facility. Seven letters of intent (LoIs) through 1985 reflecting repeated target misses and renegotiations.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

decreased · moderate

lower spending share

↓

monetary expansion direction

monetary.monetary_expansion_direction

Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.

decreased · weak

contractionary (balance sheet shrink, rates above Taylor)

Enacted by

brazil_figueiredo_final_military_1979_1985

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.

unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred

viafiscal.spending_levelmonetary.monetary_expansion_direction

SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …

supported

Across the 2008-2014 ZLB era and the 2020-2021 pandemic-response window, large-scale de-facto monetary finance of fiscal expansion in the US, Japan, and the Eurozone did not produce headline-CPI inflation consistent with naive quantity-theoretic monetisation predictions: cumulative central-bank balance-sheet expansion exceeded 15% of GDP while CPI YoY remained below 3% in each economy across both windows.

monetary_finance_zlb_no_inflationinferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

REFUTED — CPI threshold breach: USA zlb_2008_2014 peak 3.81% in 2008; USA covid_2020_2021 peak 4.68% in 2021; Eurozone CPI not loaded

refuted

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Fiscal multipliers are state-dependent: large at ZLB, small near full employment; no single-number answer is policy-relevant.

fiscal_multipliers_state_dependentinferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

REFUTED — sign - OPPOSITE claim +, cumulative_effect=-1.569, h=5, p_h=0.0155

refuted

Post-2008 large-scale asset purchase programmes by the Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan produced a measurable divergence between asset-price inflation (equities and residential real estate) and headline consumer-price inflation until roughly 2021.

qe_asset_inflation_vs_cpi_divergence_post_2008inferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

refuted — Only 2 of 8 countries had even a 0.10 log-point asset-vs-CPI gap by 2020 (mean GAP_2020 = -0.02). The post-2008 divergence story does not survive a pa…

refuted

Across OECD economies 1995-2021, the cumulative fiscal multiplier on real output at the zero lower bound (defined as quarters with policy rate ≤ 0.50% AND inflation expectations anchored below 2.5%) exceeds 1.2 at horizon h=8 quarters, while the comparable normal-regime multiplier is below 0.7.

zlb_state_dependent_multiplier_pk_framinginferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:NAQ_government_consumption', 'manual: Ramey-Zubairy military news shocks; Guajardo-Lei…

run pending

Post-2008 quantitative easing operated principally through a Minsky-style financialisation channel — collateral-revaluation, portfolio-rebalancing into long-duration risk assets, and a yield-driven compression of risk premia — rather than through the textbook quantity-theoretic broad-money or expectations channels.

qe_financialisation_minsky_channel_2008_2021inferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (14)

run pending

Abenomics' combined monetary-fiscal expansion lifted Japanese inflation and output partially but failed to durably escape the deflation equilibrium, consistent with NK models of near-permanent ZLB traps.

abenomics_monetary_fiscal_coordination_effectinferred

viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level

SUPPORTED — shape=ITS, sign matches claim +, mean_gap=+6.836, z=+17

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

IMF Stand-By Arrangement (Jun 2018, expanded Sep 2018)

ARG·2018

match

1.5

spending levelmonetary expansion direction

Milei Shock Therapy — Argentina December 2023 onward

ARG·2023

match

1.5

spending levelmonetary expansion direction

Greece Convergence Programme 1994-1999

GRC·1994