IESET.
Policies·ca_wilson_tax_reform_1987

Wilson Tax Reform 1987 (Phase I)

CAN·1987 1988·enacted 1987-06-18candidate
movestax progressivitytax corporate

What the policy did

Finance Minister Michael Wilson's White Paper on Tax Reform (June 1987) cut top personal rate from 34% federal to 29%, consolidated ten brackets to three, broadened the base by eliminating shelters, cut the general corporate rate from 36% to 28% phased, and laid groundwork for replacing the Manufacturers' Sales Tax with the Goods and Services Tax (GST, enacted later under second Mulroney term).

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
decreased · moderate
less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)
tax corporate
fiscal.tax_corporate
Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
decreased · moderate
lower corporate tax burden

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The 2000 Schroder corporate + personal tax reform package (top personal rate cut from 53 to 42 percent staged 2000-2005, corporate rate cut from 40 to 25 percent, capital-gains exemption on inter-corporate shareholdings) is associated with a 1.0 to 1.5 percentage point rise in the German top-1 pre-tax income share over 2000-2008 vs Eurozone synthetic control, but no measurable rise in aggregate output growth beyond Eurozone trend.
tax_inequality_germany_2000_schroder_reforminferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.3903, |gap|/pre_sd=0.43, p_perm=0.4 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.
tax_inequality_chile_post_pinochet_progressivityinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=0, donors=0)
run pending
Estonia's 1994 flat-tax 26 percent (subsequently reduced to 20 percent by 2015) and the unique 2000 corporate-tax reform (taxing only distributed corporate profits) produced a measurable rise in the Estonian top-1 pretax income share over 1994-2010 vs Baltic synthetic comparator (LVA, LTU), with the distributed-profit-only corporate regime channelling capital-income into top-decile reported income while reducing taxation of retained earnings.
tax_inequality_estonia_1994_flat_tax_dividend_reforminferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=1, donors=0)
run pending
Greek Memorandum-era tax hikes 2010-2018 (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent, VAT hikes to 24 percent standard, ENFIA recurring property tax 2014, solidarity surcharge 2011-2019) raised the disposable-income Gini coefficient by at least 1.5 Gini-points relative to Eurozone- comparator synthetic control over the period, with the regressivity driven by VAT and property-tax incidence rather than income-tax progressivity.
tax_inequality_greece_troika_tax_hikes_2010_2018inferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivity
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.175, |gap|/pre_sd=3.7, p_perm=0.333 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Post-apartheid South African tax structure (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent in 2017, capital-gains inclusion ratio raised 2012 + 2016, recurring property-tax effective burden via municipal rates) produced a measurable reduction in the South African top-1 pretax income share over 1995-2024 vs SADC synthetic comparator pool, with the recurring property-tax channel contributing more than the marginal-income-rate channel to the distributional effect.
tax_inequality_south_africa_property_tax_burdeninferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivity
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient pre-period coverage (years=5, donors=0)
run pending
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_extreme_poverty_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=1.296, p=0.7399)
partial
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
heritage_tax_burden_extreme_poverty_income_region_robustnessinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-1.28, p=0.2307)
partial
Progressive income-tax marginal rates (up to roughly 70% top rate) have been compatible with strong growth in post-war US 1945-1980 and Nordics, falsifying extreme-Laffer-curve positions.
top_marginal_rate_growth_tradeoffinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivity
PARTIAL — coef=+0.0006927, p=0.558 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References