Policies·cl_lge_education_law_2009

LGE Ley General de Educación 2009

CHL·2009 – ·enacted 2009-09-12·Concertacióncandidate

What the policy did

Ley 20.370 of 12 September 2009. Replaced Pinochet-era LOCE (1990). Response to April-June 2006 Pingüinos secondary-student movement. Created Agencia de Calidad + Superintendencia de Educación; partial voucher-system reforms; preserved mixed public-private-subsidised architecture.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

increased · moderate

tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating

New quality-supervision regulators.

↑

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

increased · weak

higher spending share

Expanded SEP subsidy for vulnerable pupils.

Enacted by

chile_bachelet_i_concertacion_2006_2010

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.

welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.

unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …

supported

Fiscal multipliers are state-dependent: large at ZLB, small near full employment; no single-number answer is policy-relevant.

fiscal_multipliers_state_dependentinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

REFUTED — sign - OPPOSITE claim +, cumulative_effect=-1.569, h=5, p_h=0.0155

refuted

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred

viafiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

UK Truss mini-budget 2022 gilt crisis reflected market confidence and institutional-framework rupture rather than an MMT-predicted hard fiscal limit, because the BoE restored order by intervening as issuer.

uk_truss_mini_budget_currency_sovereign_mechanisminferred

viafiscal.spending_level

partial — Both mechanism legs are directionally consistent but at least one fails the SUPPORTED threshold: FX leg holds (5.02% trough decline); yield leg partia…

partial

UK GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a matched synthetic counterfactual of similar-income anglophone/developed economies (USA, CAN, AUS, NZL, DEU, NLD, CHE) starting around 2008 and widening post-2016 (Brexit referendum).

uk_economic_decline_multi_movementinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'uk_post_2008' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_tax_burden_account_ownership_current_gapinferred

viafiscal.spending_levelregulatory.sectoral_licensing

REFUTED — top-vs-bottom gap has opposite sign and Welch p=2.887e-05

refuted

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

heritage_tax_burden_account_ownership_income_region_robustnessinferred

viafiscal.spending_levelregulatory.sectoral_licensing

REFUTED — controlled market-score coefficient has opposite sign and p=0.01161

refuted

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Sonangol oil enclave governance

AGO·1976

match

1.5

sectoral licensingspending level

Hydrocarbons nationalisation

DZA·1971

match

1.5

sectoral licensingspending level

Iraq Petroleum Company nationalisation 1972

IRQ·1972